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California Supreme Court:
Antiquated Map Alone Is Insufficient to Support Subdivision
Opinion Says Recordings Filed Prior to Statewide Regulation of Such Divisions Do Not Create Separate Lots Absent Conveyance of Parcels as Independent Properties Even if Past Transfers Noted Dividing Lines
By a MetNews Staff Writer
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—CN The house at 2207 East 21st Street in Oakland's San Antonio District. |
The California Supreme Court yesterday held that a law providing for the legal recognition of certain subdivisions of property, occurring before the adoption of state-wide regulations as to the division of land in March 1972, only applies if the parcel in question was separately conveyed as an independent lot.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero, the court rejected the assertion that the use of multiple lot numbers in an “antiquated” map evinces a “division” of the property and said that the lot was “always conveyed together” with other contiguous parcels and so it “was never itself a parcel ‘created’ as a result of ‘a division of land’ during the time period specified by the statute.”
At issue is Government Code §66412.6, which provides that “any parcel created prior to March 4, 1972, shall be conclusively presumed to have been lawfully created if the parcel resulted from a division of land in which fewer than five parcels were created and if at the time of the creation of the parcel, there was no local ordinance in effect which regulated divisions of land creating fewer than five parcels.”
No dispute exists between the parties as to the fact that the property, located in Oakland, was not subject to any local ordinance governing such divisions, but disagree as to what qualifies as a “division” under the section.
Land in Question
The land in question was initially depicted as Lot 18 on a subdivision map entitled “[M]ap of San Antonio,” which was recorded in 1869 and depicts numerous “blocks” each containing smaller units of land referred to as “lots.”
After the recording, Lot 18 was conveyed several times by name together with other contiguous lots. Specifically, in 1944, Lot 18 was conveyed, together with Lot 17 and a portion of Lot 16, by a single deed from a sole grantor to a husband and wife as joint tenants; no other transfers were recorded before 1972.
In 2015, plaintiff Alvin Cox acquired the property by single deed and applied for a certificate of compliance with the City of Oakland, requesting that the municipality recognize that Lot 18 was a separate parcel under §66412.6 which could be sold as an independent piece of real estate. After the city denied the application, Cox filed a petition for a writ of mandate asking that the trial court direct the city to issue the certificate.
Then-Alameda Superior Court Judge Paul Herbert (now retired) denied the petition. In an opinion authored by Justice Kathleen Banke, Div. One of the First District Court of Appeal reversed and directed the trial court to grant the writ requiring the city to issue the certificate, saying:
“The ability of owners to use their property as they wanted, including dividing their property into smaller lots, is…reflected by cases decided during that early time period. As a general matter these cases established that the grantees of lots depicted on a subdivision map could be restricted in their use and transfer of the property only in limited circumstances, e.g., where the deeds transferring all, or nearly all, of the lots shown on the map contained restrictions for the benefit of the other grantees.”
Yesterday’s opinion reverses the judgment.
Interplay Between Sections
Guerrero said that §66412.6 must be interpreted by reference to Government Code §66424, which defines “subdivision” as “the division, by any subdivider, of any unit or units of improved or unimproved land.” She wrote:
“Given that the Act both ‘defines “subdivision” ’…in section 66424 and ‘provides a mechanism for determining the legality of a previously established subdivision’ through section 66412.6(a)…, it may be said that the two statutes relate to the same subject, namely the division of land under the Act. This relation is further evident from the fact that the Legislature made the operative date for section 66412.6(a)—March 4, 1972—identical to ‘the effective date of legislation adding the requirement of a parcel map to the [Act] for divisions of land into four or fewer parcels.’ ”
Saying that the legislative history further supports the “interconnectedness” of the sections, the jurist opined that “it seems plain that the two statutes are in pari materia” and so “the similar phrases ‘division of land’ in section 66412.6(a) and ‘division…of…land’ in section 66424 should be given the same meaning.”
Given this interconnectedness, she remarked that “we look to authorities that have interpreted section 66424 to inform our understanding of section 66412.6(a),” and concluded that “[t]hose authorities have uniformly required that, in order to divide land and create a separate parcel, a conveyance must create a separate and exclusive property right over the parcel.”
Exclusive Property Right
Turning to Lot 18, the chief justice said:
“[N]one of the conveyances at issue conveyed an exclusive property right over Lot 18 alone. Instead, in each instance the conveyance granted the ownership of Lot 18 along with additional contiguous land. Therefore, since Lot 18 has never been conveyed ‘separately’…but instead has remained part of contiguous land ‘under sequential owners throughout its history’….[the authorities] all support the conclusion that the mere identification of Lot 18 as part of the description of contiguous land being conveyed did not ‘create[]’ Lot 18 as a separate parcel from a ‘division of land.’ ”
Saying that Div. One relied on “case law…supporting the uncontroversial proposition that a single conveyance can transfer multiple separately described lots,” she commented:
“[A]side from the Court of Appeal below, we are not aware of any court that has concluded that a grant deed’s description of a contiguous property by reference to lot numbers on an antiquated subdivision map divided the contiguous property into multiple parcels corresponding to the lot lines on the map.
“In addition, there is a compelling reason why grantors at common law might have included lot number references from antiquated subdivision maps in deeds that is distinct from an intent to divide the land conveyed. Namely, such references serve to identify the land conveyed.”
Under those circumstances, she declared that “we are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that the identification of individual lot numbers in the 1944 deed demonstrates an intention to convey something other than a single parcel.”
Statutory Purpose
Guerrero pointed out that the purpose behind §66412.6 is to provide an equitable scheme to settle the validity of divisions of land occurring before the enactment of laws regulating subdivisions and to protect those who have relied on earlier determinations.
However, she noted that the purpose is “hardly served” by allowing later purchasers of property that has never been conveyed in subdivided form to “invoke these protections.” She explained that “no common law authority supports plaintiff’s contention that Lot 18 has ever existed in subdivided form” and so “there is no reason to interpret section 66412.6(a) in a manner that would protect plaintiff’s reliance interests” which are “nonexistent.”
She added:
“Our interpretation also advances the Act’s goals of encouraging orderly community development and preventing undue burdens on the public….Under plaintiff’s interpretation,…vast numbers of parcels could be free from ‘further compliance with the…Act or any local ordinance enacted pursuant thereto.’….This circumstance risks causing undue and unexpected burdens on public infrastructure and preventing communities from ensuring that growth is orderly and in the public interest.”
The case is Cox v. City of Oakland, 2025 S.O.S. 205.
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