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Court of Appeal:
Dismissal Not Authorized by RJA for Prejudgment Violation
Majority Says While Courts Are Not Barred From Ordering Sanction Pursuant to Other Laws, Relief is Not Authorized by Racial Justice Act, Drawing Dissent
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
The Third District Court of Appeal has held, in a 2-1 decision, that the California Racial Justice Act does not authorize dismissal as a recourse for a prejudgment violation of the statute, reasoning that the terms limit available relief to certain delineated remedies.
At issue is Penal Code §745(a), enacted in 2020 as part of the Racial Justice Act (“RJA”), which provides that “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin” and provides certain circumstances under which a violation will be found.
Subdivision (e)(1) explains that “if the court finds, by a preponderance of evidence, a violation of subdivision (a), the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found from the following list” and specifies:
“Before a judgment has been entered, the court may impose any of the following remedies:
“(A) Declare a mistrial, if requested by the defendant.
“(B) Discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury.
“(C) If the court determines that it would be in the interest of justice, dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges.”
Under subdivision (e)(4), “[t]he remedies available under this section do not foreclose any other remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or any other law.”
Juvenile Wardship Petition
The question arose after a juvenile warship petition was filed in Sacramento Superior Court on June 15, 2023, against a minor identified as “R.D.” The petition alleged that the juvenile carried a loaded firearm in public, in violation of Penal Code § 25850(a), and resisted or obstructed law enforcement officials, as prohibited by Penal Code §148(a)(1), among other offenses.
After R.D. moved for release with electronic monitoring, visiting retired-Sacramento Superior Court Judge Renard Shepard denied the motion on June 30, 2023, saying:
“This is a serious criminal we’re talking about….This is a 17 year old boy who is supposed to be in high school, supposed to be going to summer school, supposed to have a summer job or something. This is a serious gang banger we are dealing with….There’s terror in the streets with teenagers like him….He’s a serious gang banger. He’s got it in his blood, in his culture. He can’t get it out of his system….He is going to wind up downtown in county jail, if not prison….”
A few days later, R.D. filed a motion to dismiss the petition under the RJA, claiming that Shepard’s comments referring to him as a “gang banger” were imbued with racial bias or animus, and the judge’s statements that gang involvement was “in his blood” and “in his culture” were improper references to his race and ethnicity. He argued that dismissal was an available remedy for the violation under §745(e)(4).
Prima Facie Showing
Sacramento Superior Court Judge Joginder Dhillon found that R.D. had made a prima facie showing of a violation of §745, set the matter for a hearing, and released the minor on home supervision.
At the hearing, Dhillon found that Shepard had violated the RJA and that his comments “reflected the potential bias or animus that the Legislature intended to address by enacting this law,” but declared that dismissal was unavailable as a remedy under §745.
He declined to reduce the felony charges under §745(e)(1)(C), finding that it would not be in the interest of justice.
On Feb. 9 of last year, R.D. filed a petition for writ of mandate. The Third District summarily denied relief.
On June 12, 2024, the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the order denying relief and issuing an order to show cause.
Petition Denied
In an opinion filed Wednesday and authored by Acting Presiding Justice Elana Duarte, the court denied R.D.’s petition for a writ of mandate. Duarte said:
“Considering the language of section 745, subdivision (e)(4) and the statute as a whole, we conclude the RJA does not authorize dismissal of one or more charges as a remedy. Rather, subdivision (e)(4) clarifies that the remedies provided for by the RJA do not preclude the minor from seeking relief under other statutes or constitutional provisions.”
Justice Jonathan K. Renner concurred that the RJA does not authorize dismissal as a remedy for an RJA violation, but said “I write separately to explain why the minor’s assertion that the court erred by not imposing a remedy in this proceeding is without merit” and concluded that “[t]he remedies listed in section 745…cannot apply factually to this proceeding.” Justice Shama Hakim Mesiwala dissented.
Listed Remedies
Duarte wrote:
“[T]he minor contends subdivision (e)(4) is properly interpreted as incorporating into the RJA all remedies available under the law….[W]e disagree with that interpretation and instead conclude that section 745, subdivision (e)(4) is properly construed to clarify that the minor is not precluded from seeking relief under other statutory or constitutional provisions despite the limited lists of remedies specifically set forth in the RJA.”
She opined:
“[W]hile the Legislature referred to ‘the following list’ in subdivision (e), it did not expressly provide that subdivision (e)(4) was intended to incorporate all available remedies into the RJA….Subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) of section 745 expressly provide a limited set of remedies applicable to remedy prejudgment…RJA violations. To construe subdivision (e)(4) as incorporating all remedies under the law (rather than merely clarifying that those other remedies remain available) would render the limited remedies…superfluous.”
Continuing, she added:
“Contrary to the minor’s arguments, echoed by our dissenting colleague…, our construction of the statute neither omits section 745, subdivision (e)(4) from the law nor leaves some RJA violations without a remedy. To the extent the minor believes the adequate remedies are provided for outside of the RJA, subdivision (e)(4) clarifies that he is not precluded from seeking a remedy otherwise provided for by law.”
Legislative Intent
Saying that “[c]ourts have…considered legislative history even in cases where the text of a statute is clear,” Duarte noted that a prior version of the proposed bill provided dismissal as a remedy but that the language was removed.
The justice remarked:
“[I]f the Legislature intended for subdivision (e)(4) to authorize the court to impose any and every remedy available under any provision of law…, there would be no need to change subdivision (e)(1)(C) and replace dismissal of charges as a remedy with the more limited authority to dismiss only enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations. This is because all types if dismissals would be remedies authorized by subdivision (e)(4).”
She added:
“With the understanding that subdivision (e) of section 745 required the juvenile court to impose a remedy, if any, that was specific to the violation, and that subdivision (e)(1) provided the court with discretion to impose or decline to impose the listed remedies in the case of a prejudgment violation, I see no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to deny the minor’s request for a reduction of one or more charges as a remedy for the RJA violation….Judge Shepard made the comments that resulted in the finding of an RJA violation when denying the minor release. The minor was released one week later; thus, he achieved the outcome he had sought at the hearing where the violation occurred.”
Mesiwala’s View
Mesiwala wrote, adding italics for emphasis:
“When a court finds a violation of the RJA, the court “shall impose” a remedy….The lead opinion concludes this mandatory language…is not mandatory in the case of a prejudgment RJA violation because the RJA specifies that in the prejudgment context, the court “may impose” certain remedies….
“But the term ‘may’ in the prejudgment context cannot be read in isolation….Construed as a whole, section 745 makes clear that a remedy specific to the violation must be imposed. The word ‘may’ that follows does not eliminate that mandate.”
She continued:
“I also depart as to the remedies available for an RJA violation. Section 745, subdivision (e) specifies that the remedy imposed must be chosen from ‘the following list.’….[T]he lead opinion concludes that the fourth paragraph is not part of the list. I disagree.”
The justice argued:
“The idea that the RJA violation here was effectively remedied works only if section 745, subdivision (e)(4) is interpreted to have the meaning minor suggests. In accordance with that meaning, minor insisted that the proper remedy for the RJA violation here was dismissal of the charges, but he had no opportunity to present evidence or argue why that remedy was factually appropriate….In my view, the juvenile court erred by failing to give him that opportunity. I would remand for the juvenile court to correct that error.”
The case is R.D. v. Superior Court, 2025 S.O.S. 424.
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