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Court of Appeal:
Majority Says Award of $0 in Attorney Fees Was Unsupportable
Dissenter Sets Forth That State High Court Found Such a Result Reasonable Where Excessive Amount Is Sought, Chides Colleagues for Basing Reversal on Their Preferences Rather Than Acceding to Call by Trial Judge
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A member of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s Div. Three yesterday accused his colleagues of impermissibly substituting their judgment for that of the trial judge in the setting of attorney fees, with the majority reversing an order awarding nil.
That, Justice Thomas M. Goethals said in his dissent, is precisely what the California Supreme Court authorized in its 1982 opinion in Serrano v. Unruh. Justice Frank Newman (now deceased) said in that opinion:
“A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.”
Orange Superior Court Judge Martha K. Gooding denied an award altogether to a prevailing party, finding that the attorneys’ billing records did not support the number of hours claimed and rendered it “impossible” to determine what would be reasonable per-hour rates. She concluded that the requested fee amount—“at least $1 Million”—was unreasonably inflated.
Sanchez’s Opinion
In his unpublished opinion reversing the denial of fees to defendant KDF Cobblestone Village in a premises liability action brought against it by Simi Akin, Justice Maurice Sanchez said, writing for the majority:
“The court had a ready means of determining the market value of the services counsel provided: the actual rate charged to the client. $180 per hour, even as a blended rate, is eminently reasonable. Although Cobblestone sought an hourly rate over three times higher than that, the court was under no obligation to grant that request. Indeed, in our view, the actual rate charged to the client is the best evidence of what is a reasonable rate for the particular work involved. There is seldom a better indicator of the market value of legal services than their actual cost in the market for legal services, especially when it is so much lower than the rate sought.”
Sanchez agreed with Gooding that it was difficult to decipher the number of hours spent, but said:
“Based on the lack of details in counsel’s declaration, the court would have been fully justified in imposing a substantial reduction to the hours counsel claimed to ensure Akin was not saddled with paying for duplicative or inefficient work. But counsel’s declaration, coupled with the court’s own experience with the case, provided it with an evidentiary basis upon which to estimate a reasonable number of hours.”
He added that “Cobblestone had a right to attorney fees” under a fee-shifting clause in a lease “and the trial court had a sufficient evidentiary basis to render an award in some amount,” declaring:
“[T]he complete denial of the motion was not supported by substantial evidence.”
The justice rejected Gooding’s notion that the amount sought was unreasonably inflated.
Acting Presiding Justice Eileen C. Moore concurred in Sanchez’s opinion.
Goethals’ Dissent
In his dissent, Goethals said:
“The question before us on this appeal is not whether I would have granted all or any part of appellants’ attorney fee motion. The question is whether or not the trial judge abused her discretion in denying that motion.”
After citing Serrano, he remarked:
“Here, after considering the evidence and argument presented by appellants at the fee hearing, the experienced trial judge denied their fee request. Among other things, after reviewing the documentation submitted by appellants, the court found it was ‘impossible...to make a meaningful finding as to reasonable hourly rates.’ While I might have made at least a token award, based on the record before us I decline to substitute my judgment for that of the trial judge whose boots were on the ground.”
The case is Akin v. KDF Cobblestone Village, G062154.
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