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Court of Appeal:
Momentary Inability to Breathe Is ‘Traumatic Condition’
Opinion Says 30 Second Application of Pressure to Throat Causing Victim to See Spots, Feel Dizzy May Be Sufficient Injury to Support Felony Domestic Violence
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held yesterday that evidence that a victim saw spots, had difficulty swallowing, and felt dizzy as her live-in boyfriend held her by the neck for approximately 30 seconds was sufficient to establish probable cause that she suffered a traumatic condition for purposes of a felony domestic violence offense.
Penal Code §273.5 prohibits “willfully inflict[ing] corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition” on certain romantic partners, including spouses and live-in girlfriends. The term “corporal injury” is defined by its plain meaning but “traumatic condition” is defined by statute as “condition of the body, such as a wound or external or internal injury, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force.”
The section requires the prosecution to prove two elements: that a defendant willfully inflicted bodily injury on a qualifying romantic partner and that the damage resulted in a traumatic condition.
At issue are changes made to the section in 2011 by Senate Bill 430, which altered the definition of “traumatic condition” to add “strangulation or suffocation” to the non-exhaustive list of injuries. As part of the changes, §273.5(d) provides that “[f]or purposes of this section, ‘strangulation’ and ‘suffocation’ include impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of a person by applying pressure on the throat or neck.”
Charges Filed
Appellant Edward Reid was charged in July 2023 with assault causing great bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code §245(a)(4), and inflicting injury on a cohabitating partner, in violation of Penal Code §273.5(a).
His live-in girlfriend, identified as Jane Doe and referred to in the opinion as “Jane,” testified at the preliminary hearing that the couple got into an argument over buying dog food and Reid grabbed her by the neck, choking her for about 30 seconds.
After the hearing, a magistrate judge did not hold Reid to answer on the domestic violence charge, citing a lack of evidence that Doe suffered from a traumatic condition. The Riverside County District Attorney’s Office filed an information charging the defendant with both counts anyway, arguing that it had proved up all elements of the domestic violence charge.
Reid filed a motion under Penal Code §995, requesting that the court set aside the domestic violence count. Retired Riverside Superior Court Judge James S. Hawkins, sitting by assignment, granted the motion after consulting with the magistrate. The prosecution appealed.
Acting Presiding Justice Eileen C. Moore authored the opinion reversing the order. Justices Thomas M. Goethals and Maurice Sanchez joined in the opinion.
Traumatic Condition
Moore turned to the legislative history of Senate Bill 430 for guidance as to what constitutes a traumatic condition and noted that the bill was enacted to remedy the fact that strangulation and suffocation cases were often overlooked under prior law despite making up a significant number of violent incidents between romantic partners.
She looked to jurisprudence defining the term and said that “California case law interpreting section 273.5 makes clear that even a ‘minor injury [is] sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition’ of a traumatic condition” and noted that “[t]he harm to the victim required to satisfy the ‘traumatic condition’ element of section 273.5, is a lesser degree of harm than what is required under other criminal statutes.”
Under these circumstances, the jurist opined:
“Based on the plain language of section 273.5, as well as its legislative history, it is apparent that the Legislature’s intent was to modify the definition of a ‘traumatic condition’ when there is evidence that a defendant has willfully applied force to a domestic violence victim’s throat or neck (i.e., choking).”
She added:
“[P]erhaps some judges or jurors may wrongly presume that a victim’s difficulty in breathing, or a victim’s feeling of dizziness as a result of being choked, could not qualify as a ‘traumatic injury’ under the common usage of that phrase. However, the phrase ‘traumatic condition’ as of January 1, 2012, is now defined to address those factual circumstances.”
Choking Injury
Addressing the first element of §273.5(a), Moore said:
“Jane testified that Reid grabbed her throat with his right hand and applied pressure. She said the pressure was ‘tight’ and this ‘hurt.’ The deputy testified that Jane told him that this painful choking of her throat lasted for about 30 seconds.
“Based on this evidence, we find there is a rational ground for assuming (i.e., probable cause) that Reid inflicted corporal injury upon Jane within the plain meaning of those two italicized words….That is, there is some evidence Reid willfully hurt Jane’s body by the application of force.”
As to the requirement that the injury resulted in a traumatic condition, she reasoned:
“Based on the evidence that Reid applied pressure to Jane’s throat or neck (i.e., choking), we find there is a rational ground for assuming (i.e., probable cause) that Jane’s bodily injury then resulted in a ‘traumatic condition’ as that term is defined….That is, as to the testimony about Jane having difficulty breathing and swallowing, it is plainly evident that Reid was allegedly ‘impeding the normal breathing’ of Jane as he was applying pressure to her throat or neck.”
The justice said that Reid seemed to “erroneously blend” the terms “traumatic condition” and “corporal injury” and concluded:
“[T]he statute simply does not employ the term—nor does it require—a ‘traumatic injury.’ Reid’s argument also appears to ignore the evidence of Jane’s difficulty in breathing, and the evidence of her feeling dizzy or faint, as well as ignoring the Legislature’s passage of [Senate Bill 430].”
In a footnote, Moore addressed Hawkins’ consultation with the magistrate judge before making a ruling on the motion to dismiss, saying that “it was improper for the 995 judge to consult with the magistrate about the ruling at the preliminary hearing, just as it would be improper for an appellate court justice to consult with a superior court judge about his or her rulings in any particular case.”
The case is People v. Reid, 2024 S.O.S. 3332.
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