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Court of Appeal:
Doctrine of Transferred Intent Has Not Been Abrogated
Murder Conviction in Killing of Unintended Victim Upheld
By Kimber Cooley, Staff Writer
The Fifth District Court of Appeal yesterday upheld a murder conviction in the death of an unintended shooting victim, holding that Senate Bill 1437, which virtually eliminated the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, did not abolish the doctrine of transferred intent.
Acting Presiding Justice Bert Levy wrote the opinion, affirming a judgment denying a petition for resentencing by Tulare Superior Court Judge Nathan G. Leedy. Justices Donald R. Franson and Thomas DeSantos joined in the opinion.
Armondo Lopez was convicted by jury of first-degree murder in the 1995 death of Manuel Alcantar, and of premeditated attempted murder of another man, Rigoberto Yanez, who survived the shooting. Lopez knew that his codefendant in the case, Ramiro Ojeda, wanted to kill Yanez.
On the night of the shooting, they together observed Yanez. in a van. After recognizing Yanez in the vehicle, Ojeda left to retrieve a firearm and, when he returned, the two discussed what route to take to approach the van.
Before shots were fired, Lopez held the rifle for Ojeda while Ojeda climbed a fence, then handed over the gun and jumped the fence himself.
Lopez was present when Ojeda opened fire on the van, injuring Yanez and fatally wounding Alcantar, whose presence in the van had not been known.
Evidence was presented at trial that Ojeda would not have undertaken the shootings if Lopez and William Ramirez, a minor, had not been present, and Lopez admitted his role was “probably” as a lookout. In 2021, Lopez filed a petition for resentencing, arguing he could no longer be convicted of murder based on the amendments enacted in the bill, which became effective in 2019. In 2023, Leedy held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition, finding Lopez had harbored his own intent to kill.
Malice Not Imputed
Senate Bill 1437 amended existing law to ensure that murder liability would not be imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Specifically, the bill was meant to ensure that the malice required for murder could no longer be fictionally imputed to a person based solely on participation in a crime.
Lopez’s murder conviction was supported by two legal theories—accomplice liability and transferred intent.
Levy said the bill does not undermine aiding and abetting theories of liability. He wrote:
“Following Senate Bill 1437, a defendant may still be liable for murder as a direct aider and abettor because a direct aider and abettor must possess malice aforethought.”
Transferred Intent
Finding that the bill does not alter Lopez’s liability as an accomplice to the murder, the question for the court was whether the theory of transferred intent survived enactment of the bill.
This was “an issue of first impression,” Levy noted.
He rejected Lopez’s argument that the theory of transferred intent is a theory of imputed liability incompatible with the changes set forth in the bill. Levy wrote:
“Under the doctrine of transferred intent, if a defendant shoots at one victim with malice aforethought, but instead kills someone else who is standing nearby, the defendant is deemed liable for murder notwithstanding the lack of intent to kill that decedent.”
Plain Language
Looking to the plain language of the bill, Levy said:
“Nothing in the language of this bill demonstrates or even reasonably suggests that, when eliminating the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the Legislature also intended to abolish the doctrine of transferred intent.”
He noted that the doctrine existed in common law and was a doctrine that survived after the enactment of California’s murder statute in 1872. Given the long history of the doctrine, he said:
“Thus, we presume the Legislature knew about this doctrine when it enacted Senate Bill 1437. The Legislature, however, did not mention the doctrine of transferred intent, and we will not presume the Legislature intended to overthrow a long-established principle of law without making its intention clear.”
Intent to Kill
Levy distinguished the doctrine of transferred intent from the natural and probable consequences doctrine undermined by Senate Bill 1437, explaining:
“The doctrine of transferred intent requires an intent to kill….In contrast, the natural and probable consequences doctrine permitted an accomplice to be convicted of murder without malice aforethought.”
Because the record demonstrated that Lopez had his own intent to kill when he aided and abetted in the fatal shooting, his conviction was proper even after the changes to murder liability in the bill.
The case is People v. Lopez, 2024 S.O.S. 722.
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