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S.C. Adopts Timeliness Bright-Line Rule for Appeals of Writs of Administrative Mandate
Jenkins Says Clock for Appeal Starts Running Upon Formal Entry of Judgment, Not Earlier Orders
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The time to appeal in administrative mandate proceedings starts to run with the formal entry of judgment, or the service of notice of entry of judgment, and not upon the filing of an order that may resolve the issues in the case, the California Supreme Court held yesterday.
California Rule of Court 8.104(a)(1) provides:
“[A] notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of:
“(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served;
“(B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or
“(C) 180 days after entry of judgment.”
The decision comes in a case where a police officer filed a writ of administrative mandate challenging the decision of a personnel board to uphold a 44-hour suspension of employment issued by his employer. After the petition was denied, the officer appealed the decision within 30 days of the service of notice of entry of the judgment but outside the 60-day time frame from the initial order denying the petition.
Justice Martin J. Jenkins authored the opinion for a unanimous court, reversing the judgment of Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal upon finding—in an opinion by then-Acting Presiding Justice Cynthia Aaron (now retired)—that an order on a petition for a writ of administrative mandate may constitute an appealable final judgment when it effectively resolves the case.
Jenkins noted a split in authority on the question and wrote:
“Some Courts of Appeal, including that in this case which dismissed the appeal as untimely, hold that the time starts to run with the filing of an ‘order’ that disposes of all issues in the case and contemplates no further action, not with subsequent entry of a ‘judgment.’….Other Courts of Appeal hold that the time starts to run with the entry of a ‘judgment,’ not with the filing of a prior ‘order’….”
Resolving the split, he declared a bright-line rule and said “the time to appeal in administrative mandate proceedings starts to run with entry of ‘judgment’ or service of notice of entry of ‘judgment,’ rather than with the filing of, or service of notice of the filing of, an ‘order,’ minute order, or other ruling.”
Presiding Justice Patricia Guerrero did not participate in the matter and Justice Maurice Sanchez of Div. Three of the Fourth District sat by assignment on the matter.
Writ Proceedings
The decision comes in a case stemming from the May 2019 suspension by the City of Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety of Officer David Meinhardt. The city’s personnel board upheld the suspension.
Meinhardt challenged the action in Santa Clara Superior Court. Judge Peter Kirwan on Aug. 6, 2020 ordered the filing of a document, entitled “ORDER” which contains legal rulings and includes the statement “the Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus is DENIED.”
The clerk of the court served the order on the parties on the same day as its issuance.
On Sept. 4, 2020, the parties signed and submitted to the court a document entitled “JUDGMENT” which provides:
“On August 6, 2020, the Court issued an Order Denying Petitioner David Meinhardt’s Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus….For the reasons set forth in the Order, the Court hereby enters Judgment for Respondents City of Sunnyvale, et al., and against Petitioner David Meinhardt, who shall take nothing by this action.”
Kirwan signed the judgment on Sept. 17, 2020 and Meinhardt served a “Notice of Entry of Judgment” on the Sunnyvale board and department on Sept. 22, 2020. The court entered the judgment on its docket on Sept. 25, 2020.
On October 25, 2020, Meinhardt filed a notice of appeal.
Statutory Right
Jenkins noted that the right to appeal in California is statutory and pointed to Code of Civil Procedure §904.1 as providing a list of appealable judgments and orders. The first on the list is a “judgment, except an interlocutory judgment” and several types of “orders” are explicitly made appealable.
The jurist explained that an order granting or denying a petition for writ of administrative mandate is “not enumerated in section 904.1 as an appealable order” and no other “statute expressly make[s] such an order appealable.”
He said:
“Despite the requirement of a ‘judgment,’ the significance of the one judgment rule, and statutory limitations on what is appealable, reviewing courts, including ours, have deemed orders and other rulings to be the ‘judgments’ under certain circumstances, such as when the ruling is sufficiently final to constitute the one judgment in the case, to promote judicial economy, to preserve a party’s right to appeal, and to permit appellate review on the merits.”
He remarked that “[t]his practice has been common in cases involving orders that reflect the trial court’s final decision but are not statutorily appealable, such as orders granting summary judgment…and orders sustaining demurrers without leave to amend” and that “[a]ppellate courts have followed this practice in the context of administrative mandate proceedings as well.”
Permitting Versus Dismissing
Jenkins pointed out that the cases determining that an order denying a petition counts as a final judgment have done so in the context of allowing—rather than dismissing—an appeal.
Finding this distinction to be significant, he reasoned:
“[T]he fact that an appellate court may preserve an appeal by deeming an order or other ruling to be a judgment does not necessarily mean the order or ruling is the judgment for all purposes, including commencing the time in which an appeal may be taken. It is in the context of preserving the right to appeal that we have stated that an order or other ruling constitutes a judgment. We are aware of no case of this court construing a court’s ruling to be a judgment for the purpose of dismissing an appeal as untimely—in administrative mandate proceedings or otherwise—and we decline to do so here.”
He continued:
“[A] holding that an order or other ruling that is sufficiently final to constitute a judgment also commences the running of the time to appeal under rule 8.104(a)(1) would require parties to guess whether any ruling issued in the case may later be construed by a reviewing court to be the judgment that started the appellate clock. The Court of Appeal here stated that parties must timely appeal from rulings that are ‘in effect’ judgments…but it may not always be clear in a given case whether a ruling is sufficiently final to effectively constitute a judgment.”
The justice was unpersuaded by the argument that the rule announced by the court would produce unnecessary delays in administrative mandate proceedings and opined:
“[W]e are confident that trial courts, parties, and counsel will work together to ensure that judgments are timely signed and entered. In the event this does not occur, parties may pursue other options, such as the filing of a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to enter judgment.”
He declared:
“Our resolution of the question better promotes clarity and uniformity, access to the courts for all parties—whether represented by counsel or not—and preserves the right to appellate review on the merits. We conclude that entry of—or service of notice of entry of—the September 25 Judgment started the time to appeal in this case and that Meinhardt’s notice of appeal, filed October 15, 2020, was therefore timely.”
The case is Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale, 2024 S.O.S. 2539.
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