Page 3
C.A. Affirms $222,952 Award as Sanction in DVRO Matter
Opinion Says Award Is Appropriate Where Husband Was Required to Defend Himself Against Wife’s Allegations of Abuse Which Were Found ‘Self-Serving,’ ‘Not Credible’
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Four of the First District Court of Appeal yesterday affirmed an award of more than $200,000 in sanctions against a wife following a domestic violence restraining order hearing in which she unsuccessfully accused her husband of abuse, saying the order was justified under a statute authorizing the award of fees when a party “frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement….and reduce the cost of litigation.”
Finding that the wife, Megan Detrick, lacked credibility and had “behaved in a way for most of her adulthood that is in accord” with a belief that she was above the law, San Mateo Superior Court Judge Rachel Holt concluded that awarding fees to her husband, Adam Detrick, was justified under Family Code §271, which provides:
“[A] court may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction….The court shall not impose a sanction…that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is imposed.”
Competing Petitions
The dispute arose in marriage dissolution proceedings between the Detricks after the spouses filed competing petitions for domestic violence restraining orders.
On Feb. 13, 2020, Adam Detrick put forth his request, alleging that his wife physically assaulted him, and the couple’s then-two-year-old daughter, and engaged in verbal abuse that included racial slurs against him. Megan Detrick filed hers the next day, also alleging physical and emotional abuse.
Holt held evidentiary hearings on the petitions and, on Aug. 6, 2021, granted Adam Detrick’s request and denied that of Megan Detrick. Addressing the parties’ credibility, Holt said:
“Although the Court finds that Mr. Detrick was not honest in his testimony about his drinking…habits, the Court finds that…Mr. Detrick was credible in every other aspect.”
As to Megan Detrick, the judge concluded that “[t]he Court finds the testimony of Ms. Detrick in its totality to be self-serving and not credible” and “the demeanor and attitude evidenced by Ms. Detrick towards this Court and these proceedings was that of a petulant child” who “has a deeply seeded and long-held belief that the rules and the law don’t apply to her.”
The judge granted sole custody of the couple’s daughter to her father.
Request for Fees
Following his success in obtaining the orders, Adam Detrick filed the request for $222,952.33 in attorney fees as sanctions.
As of the date of the request, San Francisco attorney Kimberly E. Lewellen and her firm, the Lewellen Family Law Group P.C., had billed $197,724.82 on the case and attributed 90% of the work to “the domestic violence proceedings and associated custody issues.” Adam Detrick also retained a criminal law specialist, who charged a flat $50,000 fee.
Holt granted the fee request, and ordered it payable in monthly installments of $5,000, saying:
“[L]ooking at just that number by itself may seem absolutely unreasonable; however, having sat through that trial and understanding…what was necessary for [Adam Detrick] to present was nearly 100 percent in response to the behavior of [Megan Detrick]…and so, therefore, these fees and costs, the Court finds are absolutely reasonable.”
Justice Jon B. Streeter wrote the unpublished opinion affirming the award. He said:
“[T]he trial court found that sanctions were warranted under section 271 and that the $222,952.33 requested by Adam, while very substantial, was reasonable under the circumstances. In particular, the court concluded the significant attorney fees incurred by Adam were a necessary response to Megan’s behavior and her accusations, which the court had found not to be credible. The court’s findings reflect a conclusion that Megan’s conduct, including her false accusations against Adam, drove up the cost of litigation, providing a basis for an award of sanctions under section 271.”
Presiding Justice Tracie L. Brown and Sonoma Superior Court Judge Dana B. Simonds, sitting by assignment, joined in the opinion.
Actions in Frustration
Streeter noted that “Megan contends an award of sanctions under section 271 is improper because the court did not find that Megan took actions that frustrated settlement, such as making an unreasonable, one-sided settlement offer.” Unpersuaded, he said:
“[T]he court was not required to make express findings specifically addressing the parties’ conduct during settlement negotiations. Section 271 applies where a party’s conduct unreasonably increases litigation costs, which can occur through obstreperous conduct or unreasonable positions taken in litigation….The court’s findings here—that Megan’s testimony and allegations were not credible, and that her conduct made it necessary for Adam to incur very substantial attorney fees—satisfy this standard.”
He was similarly unconvinced by “Megan’s assertion that…she took the more reasonable position in the litigation…by offering to settle with a mutual dismissal of the parties’ DVRO requests,” remarking:
“The trial court, who presided at the evidentiary hearing, concluded it was Megan’s conduct that made it necessary for Adam to incur substantial fees. And Adam’s attorneys stated in their declarations supporting the fee request that they and Adam concluded it was not appropriate to settle the matter with mutual restraining orders. Instead, given the nature of Megan’s accusations, it was necessary to conduct extensive work to clear Adam’s name and protect [their daughter] from future harm by Megan. That Megan has a different view on this point does not provide a ground to reverse the trial court’s award of sanctions under section 271.”
Ability to Pay
Megan Detrick also challenged the amount of the award, arguing that it was improperly ordered because the court did not take into account her ability to pay it, as required by §271. Addressing this concern, Streeter commented:
“[T]here is no indication in the record that the court did not consider the evidence that was before it pertaining to that question….We reject Megan’s suggestion that an express finding by the trial court on that question is a prerequisite to the validity of a section 271 sanctions award.”
He continued:
“Megan argued she was unable to pay Adam’s fees because she was not working and had no income and limited assets. But there was also evidence that Megan had previously worked as an interior designer, which Adam argued provided a basis for imputing income to her in the amount of at least $81,769 per year (or $6,814.08 per month). And it was undisputed that Megan’s boyfriend (with whom she was living) was paying her living expenses and providing her with a car; a sanctions obligation would not render her unable to meet those expenses. The court was not required to conclude that Megan could not afford to pay any sanctions.”
The jurist added:
“[T]he record does not support Megan’s suggestion that the court imposed a sanction on her boyfriend (a nonparty), which would be improper under section 271….The court directed only Megan to pay the sanctions award. And it is proper (and required) for a trial court to consider ‘all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities.’….In determining whether a sanctions award would impose an ‘unreasonable financial burden’ on Megan…, the court reasonably could have considered the fact that many of her own expenses were being covered. We cannot say the court’s award shocks the conscience or was influenced by passion and prejudice.”
The case is In re Marriage of Detrick, A166304.
Copyright 2024, Metropolitan News Company