Page 1
C.A. Lifts $40,000 Sanction Imposed Based on Excessive Paperwork in Opposing Motion
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A judge improperly imposed a $40,000 sanction on an attorney not for reasons set forth in a sanction motion but based on documents comprised of about 2,000 pages being filed in opposition to that motion, the Court of Appeal for this district held Friday.
The sanction motion was filed by Philip S. Wright who petitioned for a dissolution of his marriage to Iuliia Platokhina Wright. The couple separated 18 days after they were wed.
Sanctions were sought in connection with the wife’s motion for an award of $225,900 to cover the cost of Westwood attorney Oleg A. Volkov pursuing five appeals on her behalf. The motion was pursuant to Family Code §2030 under which a spouse with superior assets may be ordered to pay fees incurred by the other spouse who is lacking in means.
That motion, Philip Wright contended, was purely for sale of harassment and warranted sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure §128.7.
Trial Court’s Order
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Wendy L. Wilcox ordered Volkov to pay $40,000 not because the §2030 motion was harassing but because the response to the sanction motion “is excessive and looks to be harassing.”
Wilcox also struck the wife’s motion for attorney fees and, concluding that Volkov took the case on a contingency basis—which is disallowed by a rule of professional conduct in dissolution law cases—disqualified him.
Justice Helen Bendix of Div. One wrote the unpublished opinion reversing the orders.
Addressing the award of sanctions, she said:
“We agree with appellants that their response to Philip’s sanctions motion could not itself support an award of sanctions, at least until and unless Philip filed another sanctions motion directed at the response, or the court issued an order to show cause (OSC) on that basis. Absent a separate sanctions motion or an OSC, appellants had no notice that their response to the sanctions motion would be subject to sanctions, nor were they given the required statutory safe harbor period within which to withdraw or modify their response.”
She said that for the same reason, the order striking the §2030 motion must be reversed.
Contingency Fee
Wilcox found that there was a contingency-fee arrangement based on a statement in the §2030 fee request that Volkov had “advanced most of the legal costs, and undertook the representation at the risk of delayed payment or nonpayment.” Bendix wrote:
“Philip below identified no evidence that Iuliia had agreed to pay Volkov a percentage of any judgment in her favor, or that Volkov’s payment was contingent on obtaining a particular result….Volkov was not seeking fees from Iuliia contingent on a judgment in her favor, but fees from Philip, not contingent on any particular result but instead based on the court’s authority to compel the one party to pay the attorney fees of the other party.”
She declared:
“In short, the court erred in concluding Iuliia’s seeking fees from Philip demonstrated a prohibited contingency fee agreement, and thus erred in disqualifying Volkov.”
The case is Wright v. Wright, B330901.
Volkov represented himself and Iuliia Wright on appeal. Stephen G. Larson, Andrew J. Bedigian and Kimberly E. Wilkinson of the downtown Los Angeles firm of Larson LLP acted for Philip Wright.
Copyright 2024, Metropolitan News Company