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Court of Appeal:
Judge Was Obliged to Honor Concession by Prosecution
Panel Says Trial Court Abused Discretion by Denying Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Long-Pending Charges
By a MetNews Staff Writer
There are times when it’s appropriate for judges to spurn a concession by the District Attorney’s Office, Div. Four of the First District Court of Appeal has observed, but, it declared, circumstances did not justify a San Francisco Superior Court judge declining to dismiss a misdemeanor driving-under-the influence prosecution where the People agreed with the defendant that her speedy-trial rights had been violated by a succession of delays.
Defendant Lynette Mendoza was charged on Oct. 14, 2021. There were delays attributable to emergency COVID-19 orders issued by the governor and other authorities.
Mendoza withdrew her time waiver on Feb. 7, 2023, and invoked her speedy-trial rights under Penal Code §1382. That section requires a dismissal “unless good cause to the contrary is shown” where an accused misdemeanant “is not brought to trial within 30 days after he or she is arraigned or enters his or her plea, whichever occurs later, if the defendant is in custody at the time of arraignment or plea, whichever occurs later, or in all other cases, within 45 days after the defendant’s arraignment or entry of the plea, whichever occurs later.”
‘Good Cause’ Found
A series of continuances ensued, over Mendoza’s objection, with the Superior Court finding “good cause” based on the pandemic. The defendant’s protest that the emergency orders had expired was to no avail.
San Francisco Superior Court Judge Victor Hwang held a hearing last March 15 at which he denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. He provided a 19-page boilerplate ruling citing the pandemic.
Mendoza sought writ relief in the court’s Appellate Division which was denied. She then petitioned for a writ in the Court of Appeal.
In compliance with the 1984 decision of the California Supreme Court in Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., Div. Four on April 9 advised the parties that “the Court may issue a peremptory writ in the first instance.” It did so on Monday.
Per Curiam Opinion
In a “By the Court” opinion, Presiding Justice Tracie L. Brown and Justices Jon B. Streeter and Jeremy M. Goldman said:
“Regardless of the merits of the superior court’s position, the factual question of whether there was good cause for the delay is not properly before this court. The People not only failed to satisfy their burden to demonstrate good cause for delay but actually concede there was no good cause. Even assuming the court acted within its discretion in disregarding the People’s failure to meet their burden on the motion, there is no competent evidence to support the court’s order. Under these circumstances, we must direct the superior court to grant the motion to dismiss.”
They went on to say:
“We acknowledge that there are times when it may be appropriate for a court to reject a concession offered by the People, such as when, on appeal, the People erroneously admit trial court error….That is not the situation we have before us. Here, the People had the burden of establishing good cause for delay and coming forward with evidence to meet that burden. What occurred was not a matter of the court refusing to accept an erroneously offered concession on a point of law. Instead, the court went beyond its proper judicial role, stepped into the shoes of the prosecution, and attempted to satisfy the People’s evidentiary burden to show good cause for delay.”
Reason for Publication
The judges commented:
“[W]e take the unusual step of publishing this Palma opinion despite the fact petitioner’s right to relief is obvious and the opinion does not necessarily break new legal ground. If the facts in the court’s order are to be credited, there are potentially hundreds of misdemeanor cases in superior court that are beyond the statutory last day to commence trial under section 1382. It appears that many of the defendants in those cases sought dismissal on the same basis as petitioner. And, based on the record in this case and the three nearly identical writ petitions pending in the First District Court of Appeal, the superior court is apparently denying all similar section 1382 motions in misdemeanor cases with the same standard order used in this case.”
They continued: “According to the People, the appellate division of the superior court has stayed trial in additional misdemeanor cases raising the same claims as those in this writ proceeding. An unpublished decision in this case has no binding effect in other cases, no matter how similar they may be. By publishing this case…, we give it stare decisis effect and create binding precedent that the superior court and its appellate division are obliged to follow.”
The case is Mendoza v. Superior Court, 2024 S.O.S. 2385. A Feb. 19, 2024 report in The San Francisco Standard says: “Since mid-January, the San Francisco district attorney has been forced on a daily basis to dismiss dozens of years-old criminal cases that had become mired in the judicial system as a result of earlier Covid restrictions.
“The cases are being cast out because the delays violated the accused’s right to a speedy trial. In many cases, prosecutors were unprepared for trial as witnesses and victims proved uncooperative or were nowhere to be found after years of court inaction.”
District Attorney Brooke Jenkins is quoted as remarking:
“The courts have the power to ensure a defendant’s right to a timely trial is honored. The courts are responsible for addressing the backlog. It is unclear why they continued hundreds of cases past the statutory deadlines without establishing a legal basis. Nevertheless, this problem must be resolved by the court.”
Court Sued
On Sept. 14, 2021, San Francisco Public Defender Mano Raja and four others filed a taxpayers’ action in the Superior Court seeking a writ of mandate and injunctive relief “requiring the Superior Court, its presiding judge, and chief executive officer to prioritize criminal trials over civil ones, and to devote all the resources at their disposal—including Civic Center courtrooms—to restoring the right of the criminally accused to a speedy trial in San Francisco.”
Contra Costa Superior Court Judge Edward Weil sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, citing the 1984 decision by this district’s Court of Appeal in Ford v. Superior Court. There, Div. Three declared:
“Appellate jurisdiction to review, revise, or reverse decisions of the superior courts is vested by our Constitution only in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal.”
Weil ruled that “lack of authority to issue any relief directed at another superior court judge is fatal” to the claims raised and that relief, if any, must come from the Court of Appeal. However, Div. Four of the First District on June 8, 2023, pronounced that “Ford is not relevant to the taxpayer cause of action,” reversed the judgment of dismissal, and remanded the matter to the Superior Court.
The court sought review in the California Supreme Court which was granted by a unanimous vote last Sept. 13.
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