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Murder Conviction Stands Where Victim Died Following Removal of Life Support—C.A.
Opinion Says Beating Remains Proximate Cause of Death Because Cessation of Care Was Foreseeable
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld Friday the murder conviction of a defendant who struck a homeless man on the back of the head with a three-foot long dowel—and proceeded to bludgeon the unresponsive victim three more times in rapid succession—despite the fact that the injured party did not die until five days later when his life support systems were removed upon the request of his family.
Appealing his conviction was Wayne Jones, who beat victim Michael Robinson outside a San Diego 99 Cent Store on Jan. 11, 2020. Jones argues that the family’s decision to withdraw life support from Robinson broke the chain of legal causation and relieved Jones of liability for murder.
A jury found Jones guilty of first-degree premeditated murder in July 2022. San Diego Superior Court Judge Michael D. Washington sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison.
Justice David M. Rubin authored the opinion affirming the judgment of conviction. Presiding Justice Judith McConnell and Justice Jose S. Castillo joined in the opinion.
Proximate Cause
Rubin said that proximate cause is an element of murder and when an “intervening force” is present a court must consider whether that action is superseding or dependent. The jurist wrote:
“First, we must determine whether the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable. Or, second, if the intervening cause was unforeseeable, did it cause a type of harm that could reasonably be expected from the defendant’s initial conduct. If we can answer either of these questions in the affirmative, then the defendant remains criminally liable.”
He acknowledged that California jurisprudence does not go as far as some other states which have determined that the removal of life support cannot be an independent intervening cause of death as a matter of law. Instead, he explained, California courts analyze the facts of each case to determine whether the cessation of care acts as an independent intervening cause disrupting proximate causation.
Reasonably Foreseeable
Rubin wrote:
“Although the precise sequence of events may not have been foreseeable, such a high level of predictability is not required….Based on Jones’s actions, it is reasonable to contemplate a scenario where medical treatment might prevent death but is nonetheless undesirable because the victim could not be restored to a quality of life she or he would tolerate as acceptable. Accordingly, the jury could reasonably infer that the decision to withdraw Robinson’s life support and allow him to succumb to the injuries Jones inflicted was not ‘so unusual, abnormal, or extraordinary that it could not have been foreseen.’ ”
Turning to whether the type of harm was reasonably expected, he remarked:
“We…now…examine if removing life support for Robinson caused a type of harm that could reasonably be expected from the Jones’s conduct….[T]he injuries Jones inflicted were almost certain to kill Robinson in the absence of medical treatment, and they eventually caused Robinson’s death.”
Likened to Suicide
Jones’ placed reliance on a case finding that a victim’s suicide, due to severe pain following a non-lethal attack, was a superseding intervening cause. He argued that the Robinson’s family stood in the victim’s shoes and effectively exercised his own will to die.
Rubin pointed to Probate Code §4656 which says:
“Death resulting from withholding or withdrawing health care in accordance with this division does not for any purpose constitute a suicide….”
He reasoned that “[w]hen a surrogate decisionmaker withdraws healthcare in the circumstances seen here the resulting death” is not a suicide.
Pinpoint Instruction
Rubin said that Washington did not err in denying a request by Jones for a pinpoint jury instruction on intervening causes, writing:
“[A]lthough Jones’s requested instruction referred to an ‘independent intervening cause’ and that phrase was absent from the given instructions, the court still properly explained to the jury that if something unusual intervened, it would negate proximate causation. This is a simple and concise way of explaining an independent intervening cause in lay terms. Further, the jury was instructed that Jones’s actions needed to be a ‘substantial factor’—meaning more than a trivial or remote factor—in causing Robinson’s death. This too is a correct statement of law further informing the jury of the parameters surrounding proximate cause.”
He continued:
“As for Jones’s proposed instruction, it was potentially confusing and incomplete….[T]he proposed instruction used the term ‘independent intervening cause’ without defining it. The proposed instruction also referenced consequences that ‘would not have inevitably followed’…instead of the pertinent inquiry of consequences a reasonable person would foresee.”
The case is People v. Jones, D081131.
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