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Court of Appeal:
Intestate’s Sisters Have Standing to Challenge Trust of Which They Are Not Beneficiaries
Opinion Says Code Provision Providing That ‘Trustee or Beneficiary’ May File Petition Challenging Instrument Does Not Limit Standing to Only Those Parties
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
Div. Three of the First District Court of Appeal held yesterday that intestate heirs have standing to raise challenges to a trust in probate court that leaves nothing to them despite the relevant statute providing that “a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court” regarding the existence of such an instrument.
The decision expands upon the standing determination in the 2020 California Supreme Court case of Barefoot v. Jennings in which the high court held that the authority to petition the probate court extends not only to current trust beneficiaries but also to those formerly named as such where they allege that the change in status arose from incompetence, undue influence, or fraud.
In a decision authored by then-Justice Ming Chin (now an arbitrator/mediator), the Barefoot court expressly left open the question answered in the present appeal—whether “an heir who was never a trust beneficiary has standing under the Probate Code to challenge that trust.”
At issue is Probate Code §17200, which provides that “a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this chapter concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to determine the existence of the trust.”
Appealing a judgment invalidating a trust based on a finding of undue influence was Zakiya Jendayi, who was named the sole beneficiary of the estate of Laura Head in an instrument executed by the decedent on June 5, 2013 while she was hospitalized for vomiting blood and suffering from a documented “disturbance of consciousness.”
Head died two weeks later, on June 19, 2013, at the age of 64 without a spouse, children, or living parents. She was, however, survived by two sisters—Della Hamlin and Helaine Head—who filed the petition to challenge the trust.
Hamlin was estranged from her late sister but Helaine Head maintains that she and Laura Head remained close.
Jendayi was a former student of Laura Head, who held a doctorate degree in psychology and was employed as a professor in the Black Studies Department of San Francisco State University. In April 2013, employees with the school initiated a welfare check at Laura Head’s Oakland home after the teacher failed to show up for work.
Police found her in an “uninhabitable house,” infested with possums, and described her as emaciated, unable to walk, and mentally unwell.
She was hospitalized and found to have gastroesophageal junction cancer and chronic alcoholic cirrhosis, among other ailments. Unable to care for herself, Laura Head executed a power of attorney granting Jendayi rights to make medical decisions on her behalf.
Jendayi contacted attorney Elaine Lee that same month and asked her to draft an estate plan for Laura Head, who owned her Oakland home and other assets. Lee’s fee agreement papers listed only Jendayi as a client.
The former student, with whom Laura Head resided after the April hospital visit, never clarified the nature of her relationship with Laura Head other than to say it was “sacred.”
Following a July 2022 bench trial, Alameda Superior Court Judge Sandra K. Bean invalidated the trust upon finding that it was the product of undue influence executed by Jendayi.
Justice Carin T. Fujisaki wrote the opinion affirming the judgment and finding that the sisters had standing to challenge the trust. Presiding Justice Alison M. Tucher and Justice Victor Rodríguez joined in the opinion.
Fluid Concept
Fujisaki noted that standing for purposes of the Probate Court is a “fluid concept” and mandates that the party be beneficially interested in the controversy at hand. As to the petitioners in the present case, she wrote:
“There can be no dispute that respondents were beneficially interested in the controversy before the probate court. As intestate heirs of Dr. Head, respondents had an actual and concrete interest in Dr. Head’s estate and in invalidating the Trust that purported to disinherit them. Thus, the probate court had broad flexibility to permit respondents to maintain this trust contest in light of their relationship to Dr. Head and the trust estate.”
She continued:
“Section 17200 contains no language purporting to limit standing only to trustees and beneficiaries of a trust or otherwise indicating the Legislature’s intent to exclude others from contesting a trust in the probate court. Rather, the statute simply provides that trustees and trust beneficiaries ‘may’ petition the court under this chapter….But the mere use of the words ‘trustee or beneficiary’ is hardly an indication of a legislative intent to circumscribe the probate court’s power to confer standing to contest a trust on persons other than trustees and trust beneficiaries.”
Turning to the Barefoot case, the jurist concluded:
“Though Barefoot is not directly controlling on the facts of this case, our conclusion comports with Barefoot’s admonition to read Probate Code sections ‘consistent with the statutory scheme as a whole,’ its recognition of the broad jurisdiction and discretionary powers of the probate court, including the power to confer standing…as necessary or proper to dispose of matters presented by a petition, and its consideration of judicial economy and the public interest in preventing the administration of a trust that has been procured through fraud or undue influence.”
Undue Influence
Turning to the merits of the appeal, Fujisaki noted that a presumption of undue influence will arise upon a showing that the beneficiary had a confidential relationship with the testator, actively participated in procuring the instrument, and would benefit unduly by the terms of the trust.
As to the nature of the relationship between Laura Head and Jendayi, she said:
“Jendayi argues that mere friendship and affection does not create a confidential relationship. This is true so far as it goes…but we may reasonably infer from the record that the probate court did not rest its confidential relationship finding solely on the friendship….Notably, the evidence demonstrated that Jendayi acted on numerous occasions as Dr. Head’s attorney-in-fact pursuant to a power of attorney, including transferring title to Dr. Head’s vehicle to herself, adding herself to Dr. Head’s bank account, and retaining attorney Lee to draft Dr. Head’s testamentary instruments. Courts have consistently found a confidential relationship when the beneficiary runs the settlor’s financial affairs or has the power of attorney prior to the time a will or other testamentary document was executed.”
The justice was unpersuaded by Jendayi’s claim that there was insufficient evidence as to her active participation, pointing out that it was Jendayi who contacted Lee and instructed the lawyer to draft the instrument, and further concluded that “there was no dispute that Jendayi stood to receive a substantial benefit from the Trust, including the Randolph Avenue residence and a claim to respondents’ deceased mother’s estate.”
Judicial Bias
Jendayi also contends that she was deprived of a fair trial because Bean was biased against her, assertions she also raised in a July 5, 2023 story in the Oakland Post. In the piece, Jendayi is quoted as saying:
“I am filing a complaint against the judge because Bean withheld evidence supporting my position that there was no undue influence.
“She added false evidence against me, and Bean’s demeanor towards me was hostile and bias [sic] with Bean stating ‘The court observed the respondent’s strong, authoritative manner throughout trial which the court finds would influence a person in Dr. Head’s state.’ ”
Finding no support for the judicial-bias claim, Fujisaki remarked that “the mere fact that the court made multiple rulings against Jendayi does not demonstrate judicial bias.”
The case is Hamlin v. Jendayi, 2024 S.O.S. 3288.
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