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Court of Appeal:
‘Pushiness’ of Counsel Irrelevant to Attorney-Fee Analysis
Opinion Says Trial Judge, in Analyzing if Plaintiff Was Prevailing Party, Improperly Considered Whether Defendants Were Doing Everything They Could to Comply With Stipulated Judgment
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that a trial judge improperly considered the pushiness of an attorney in filing motions the jurist deemed to be “unnecessary” in determining whether the plaintiff was the prevailing party, entitled to attorney fees under the terms of an agreement.
Also determined to be error was the judge taking into account good-faith efforts by the defendants to fullfill their agreed-upon duties, the justices said.
The dispute arose in a case brought under the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the California Voting Rights Act against the City Ontario and others in March 2020 by Chris Robles and the California Voting Rights Initiative (“CVRI”). They sought an injunction against the at-large City Council elections scheduled for later that year ans an order requiring that it conduct district elections, instead.
The plaintiffs were represented by Scott J. Rafferty of Walnut Creek in both the trial court and Court of Appeal.
After San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Michael A. Sachs sustained, with leave to amend, a demurrer filed by the city, the parties resolved the case and submitted a stipulated judgment providing that the districting process would follow the “standards and procedures” outlined in the California Fair Maps Act.
Attorney-Fee Provision
The stipulation provided that the city would pay the plaintiffs “$300,000 in full satisfaction of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses in this Action consistent with Elections Code section 14030.”
Sec. 14030 grants a court authority to award reasonable fees to the prevailing party in an action to enforce certain election laws.
Multiple maps were eventually developed by the city but the plaintiffs were unsatisfied with the defendant’s efforts, saying that the municipality violated rules regarding the timing of mandated public hearings and failed to offer the public sufficient opportunity to understand and contribute to the districting process. Robles and CVRI filed a motion to enforce the judgment, citing alleged failures to comply with the stipulated terms.
At a hearing on Oct. 4, 2022, Sachs said that “it does appear that the City has not complied with the terms of the settlement.” Robles then offered a proposed map nicknamed the “Unity Map,” which the city adopted after some initial resistance.
Fee Request
In January 2023, the plaintiffs moved for additional attorney fees and post-judgment costs for the time spent seeking the enforcement of the judgment. They cited language in the stipulation’s mutual release of claims providing that the plaintiffs released defendants “from any and all claims…including…attorneys’ fees of whatever nature, involving or relating to the City’s electoral system…except for rights to enforce this Stipulation.”
The judge expressed skepticism that the plaintiffs qualified as a prevailing party under §14030 and said:
“My position has always been…that the stipulation that the parties entered into did not provide fees beyond those already paid. And that still is of my belief. Also, it’s of my belief that the motions filed by Mr. Robles and his attorney, since I’ve had the case, have been unnecessary. What I perceived was simply Mr. Robles pushing the matter, pushing it, pushing it, pushing it because it wasn’t moving quick enough.
“As we spoke about on numerous occasions, when we have these motions and issues before me, the City of Ontario has been doing everything they can. You may disagree with that, counsel, but I believe they have been doing everything they could in their power to comply with the stipulation they’ve entered into.”
On March 6, 2023, Sachs denied the request for the payment of fees incurred after the stipulated judgment was entered.
Acting Presiding Justice Eileen C. Moore wrote the opinion, filed Oct. 24, 2024 and certified for publication on Wednesday, reversing the denial, saying:
“Plaintiffs had the legal right, based on the plain language of the stipulated judgment, to seek additional attorneys fees for enforcing its terms.” Justices Joanne Motoike and Martha K. Gooding joined in the opinion.
Terms of Stipulation
Moore recited that the defendants’ position is that the language of the stipulation providing for $300,000 in fees not only includes fees already incurred but also encompasses any future attorney fees. That, she said, ignores the language relating to efforts that might be expended to enforce the stipulated judgment.
She added:
“[I]nterpreting the language in this matter would also require us to ignore the following sentence: ‘The City accepts plaintiffs attorneys’ statement for this claim and representation that it is based on actual time and expenses incurred.’ ‘[I]ncurred’ is in the past tense. If the parties had intended this language to cover future attorney fees, the language should have been clear on that point.”
The justice continued:
“What we have before us is language which set forth an attorney fees award for fees already ‘incurred.’ The language clearly states that in most situations, plaintiffs were precluded from seeking further attorney fees. But the express language of the stipulated judgment also included a carve-out ‘to enforce this stipulation.’ That is exactly what plaintiffs sought when they filed their motion to enforce. Despite the voluminous briefing on this issue, at the end of the day, this is not a close call.”
Prevailing Party
Concluding that the trial court erred in determining that plaintiffs had no right to seek the additional fees, she declared that “[w]e therefore remand for the trial court to decide, in the first instance, whether plaintiffs qualify as prevailing parties, and if so, the amount of fees that should be awarded.”
Turning to Sachs’ comments about the plaintiffs’ attorney “pushing the matter,” she wrote:
“This comment was dicta once the court decided plaintiffs had no legal entitlement to seek attorney fees. But this statement also reflects an incorrect standard for determining the prevailing party, which we clarify for purposes of remand.”
Saying that an analysis of whether a party will be considered as “prevailing” looks not just to whether the party obtained a favorable judgment but whether that litigant obtained some sought-after relief, Moore declared that “whether plaintiffs’ counsel was ‘pushing’ or whether defendants were ‘doing everything they can,’ is not relevant to an assessment of which party should be granted prevailing party status.”
The case is Robles v. City of Ontario, 2024 S.O.S. 3548.
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