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Court of Appeal:
Law to Reduce Pretextual Stops Does Not Make All Illegal
Opinion Says Legislation Requiring Officers to State Reasons for Stop, Enacted for Purpose of Curbing Racially-Based Traffic Detentions, Does Not Operate to Invalidate Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
Div. One of the First District Court of Appeal held yesterday that new legislation that requires law enforcement officers to inform a driver or pedestrian of the reason for a detention—enacted to counteract concerns that police engage in a widespread practice of stopping individuals for racially biased reasons—does not operate to make all pretextual stops illegal.
The court also held that a traffic stop is not considered unduly prolonged just because an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle earlier than was done.
Raising the Fourth Amendment challenges was Adrian Valle, who argued that a search of his vehicle by Officer Brett Wright of the Santa Rosa Police Department was conducted in violation of the U.S. Constitution. On March 31, 2023, Wright was on routine patrol at about 10 p.m. when he observed Valle at a gas station, recognizing the subject as an active gang member.
Wright noticed that Valle’s car lacked a front license plate in violation of the Vehicle Code. Before conducting a traffic stop for the infraction, Wright’s partner requested the assistance of an officer with the canine unit.
At approximately 10:03 p.m., Wright stopped Valle, informed him of the license plate violation, and requested his driver’s license. Wright had nearly finished writing up a citation when the officer arrived with a dog.
The canine walked around the perimeter of Valle’s vehicle and, at 10:10 p.m., signaled an alert to his handler.
A subsequent search of the vehicle by Wright revealed a loaded handgun in the center console. Valle was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and carrying a concealed handgun in a vehicle, in violation of Penal Code §§ 29800 and 25400.
Fourth Amendment Claim
On Aug. 28, 2023, retired Contra Costa Judge David B. Flinn, sitting on assignment to the Sonoma Superior Court, granted Valle’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and dismissed the case. In so ruling, he referenced Vehicle Code §2806.5, effective as of Jan. 1 of this year, which provides:
“A peace officer making a traffic or pedestrian stop, before engaging in questioning related to a criminal investigation or traffic violation, shall state the reason for the stop. The officer shall document the reason for the stop on any citation or police report resulting from the stop.”
Flinn said:
“[T]his was very clearly a pretextual stop….[T]here was no reason not to write the citation at the gas station….[T]hey let him drive while they call for the canine. And I think that the court must take judicial notice of the legislature in California and this year’s session, [passed] laws that make[] pretextual stops illegal. This stop under the legislation [that] comes into effect on January 1st would absolutely be clear. But I find that it was an undue detention and a delayed detention. The entire process could have been completed…before the dog was assembled for searching. . . .It was pretextual and it was a prolonged delay.”
Retired First District Court of Appeal Presiding Justice Peter J. Siggins, sitting by assignment, wrote the opinion reversing the orders granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the action. Acting Presiding Justice Kathleen Banke and Justice Monique Langhorne Wilson joined in the opinion.
Prolonged Detention
Siggins noted that police may not extend an otherwise completed traffic stop in order to conduct a sniff-search by a canine without reasonable suspicion. However, he said that the utilization of a dog during the time it ordinarily takes to write up a traffic ticket does not unduly delay the detention.
Pointing out that “[a] traffic stop begins for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when an officer pulls a vehicle over for a traffic infraction,” he wrote:
“Here, the court held that Valle’s detention was unduly prolonged because the traffic stop should have begun earlier, at the gas station, rather than in the parking lot after Valle drove approximately a quarter of a mile. But by including in its calculus the time between when the police first observed Valle at the gas station and when he was pulled over, the court erred….We know of no case holding that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs at any time prior to effectuating the stop, and counsel for Valle has cited none. Yet, even in light of this error, we would affirm if the court’s conclusion that the traffic stop was prolonged to allow for the dog sniff was supported by the evidence. There is, however, no such evidence.”
He opined:
“Officer Wright began the process of writing the citation for the Vehicle Code violation expeditiously. And the dog arrived and sniffed the car for weapons while Wright was still completing the citation. There is simply no evidence that the stop which led to the seizure was unconstitutionally prolonged.”
The jurist explained that the U.S. Supreme Court “has long held” that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved as “the only pertinent inquiry is whether the officer had an objective basis” for the detention.
Acknowledging that the lack of a front license plate has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for a stop, he said that “[w]hether the officer also had additional reasons for conducting the traffic stop does not eliminate an otherwise reasonable suspicion that a driver was violating the law.” Turning to the effect of §2806.5, he said that “[b]y its terms, section 2806.5 did not apply to Valle’s March 2023 traffic stop” but “the trial court…also based its decision to grant the motion to suppress on its belief that the new legislation would make pretext stops illegal.”
Declaring this conclusion to be “incorrect,” Siggins wrote:
“Nothing in Assembly Bill No. 2773…which contains section 2806.5…, alters…Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It is true that the legislation was originally introduced in response to concerns that the United States Supreme Court’s [jurisprudence] had led to the widespread use of pretext stops and that such stops were often conducted in a racially biased manner….As initially proposed, section 2806.5 contained a provision providing that a police officer’s failure to state the reason for the stop was ‘grounds for filing a motion to suppress.’…But this provision was later removed by the Senate.”
He continued:
“Thus, as enacted, section 2806.5 merely requires notice from the police to the detainee regarding the objective reason for a stop….
“[S]ection 2806.5, while serving other policy goals, has no impact on the legality of pretextual stops or the admissibility of evidence obtained during such stops. Rather, traffic stops, whether pretextual or otherwise, remain subject to the federal constitutional limitations discussed above.”
The case is People v. Valle, 2024 S.O.S. 3260.
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