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Court of Appeal:
Sperm Donor Not Entitled to Seek Parentage After Adoption Despite Years of Visitation
Opinion Says Amendments to Family Code Allowing Findings of More Than Two Parents Do Not Provide Biological Father Path to Parentage
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Six of this district’s Court of Appeal held yesterday that a sperm donor who agreed he would have “no paternal rights whatsoever” and “waive[d] his parental rights” in any future adoption proceeding lacks standing to later assert parentage under amendments to the Family Code providing for findings of more than two parents.
The court was unpersuaded by the argument that the parents of his biological child—conceived using in vitro fertilization and later adopted by the non-biological step-parent—should be estopped from relying on his consent to the child’s adoption and termination of his rights because they promised him an on-going relationship with the child in the donor agreement and failed to allow his continued visitation after more than a decade of contact.
Appealing an order granting a motion to quash the petition to establish parentage was C.C., who asserts that the appeal is crucial to the protection of non-traditional families in California and contends that his post-adoption conduct of maintaining regular visitation with the child entitles him to parental rights.
C.C. seeks relief under Family Code §7630(b) which states that “[a]ny interested party may bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship presumed under subdivision (d)…of Section 7611.”
Family Code §§7611(d), in turn, provides that a presumed parent is one who “receives the child into their home and openly holds out the child as their natural child.”
He also cites Sec. 7812, enacted following the passage of Senate Bill 274 in 2013, which allows a court to find that “more than two persons” have a “claim to parentage” if “recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child.”
Donor Agreement
The donor agreement signed by C.C. and the child’s biological mother, R.B., set forth that it was the “intent of the parties” to “create an extended family for our child[] and for ourselves” and guaranteed C.C. “substantial and continuing contact with the child[]…[consisting of] weekly visitation of up to 24 hours…and an annual ‘vacation time’ of two consecutive or non-consecutive weeks per calendar year.”
Adoption of any ensuing child by R.B.’s wife, L.B., was expressly contemplated in the agreement.
After the child, identified as “N.,” was born, L.B. successfully petitioned for step-parent adoption.
For the first 11 years of N’s life, C.C. exercised the visitation contemplated in the donor agreement. Shortly before the child’s twelfth birthday, C.C. was informed that N. no longer wanted to continue their relationship.
Efforts to resume visitation were unsuccessful and C.C. filed the petition to seek recognition of a parental relationship.
San Luis Obispo Superior Court Judge Matthew G. Guerrero granted the motion to quash the petition, finding that the donor agreement contemplated only visitation privileges, not parental rights, and that C.C.’s voluntary consent to termination of his parental rights undermined standing.
Justice Tari L. Cody wrote the opinion affirming the ensuing judgment, saying:
“We are not unsympathetic to appellant’s position. Our laws have continued to evolve to allow for many types of legally recognized parents and families. Unfortunately for appellant, those laws do not allow him or us to ignore the consequences of a final adoption order, which gave N.’s legal parents, not the courts, the right to decide whether and with whom she spends her time.”
Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert and Justice Hernaldo J. Baltodano joined in the opinion.
Standing to Assert
Cody explained that “[r]espondents argue, and we agree, this appeal turns on whether the trial court erred in dismissing the amended petition for lack of standing pursuant to section 8617.”
Sec. 8717 provides that “the existing…parents of an adopted child are…relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for, the adopted child, and have no right over the child” absent a waiver of the termination of rights signed by both the “existing” and adoptive parents prior to adoption.
The jurist said:
“[Waiver] does not apply because the donor agreement did not purport to waive termination of appellant’s parental rights. Rather, the donor agreement repeatedly states appellant agrees to terminate his parental rights, understands he has no parenting rights whatsoever,… and understands he is prohibited from bringing “any action…for custody or guardianship in any future situations….”
C.C. argues that there is “nothing in any of [the adoption] statutes, nor in any case cited by the [respondents] or the trial court…which holds that a stepparent adoption somehow neutralizes the statutory scheme enacted by S.B. 274” allowing for a finding of parentage in more than two parties.
Unpersuaded, Cody opined:
“Our research has not revealed any cases where someone whose parental rights were terminated was later found to have standing to pursue custody under any theory, even an ongoing parent-child relationship. The closest is a dependency case holding that if the law is interpreted to allow a person whose parental rights have been terminated to later seek presumed parent status, the statutes governing adoption ‘would be meaningless and the goals of stability and finality…would be substantially undermined.’….We believe this rationale is equally applicable here.”
She continued:
“Appellant argues there is ‘no evidence to support the finding that [he] relinquished his right to enforce his legal right to contact with N…because he did not do so.’ We disagree. His signature on the consent to adoption and the resulting adoption order sufficiently supports finding he permanently relinquished his right to contact with N….There is simply no law permitting designation as a legal parent after the termination of parental rights and a child’s adoption.”
Equitable Estoppel
Turing to C.C.’s equitable estoppel argument, Cody remarked:
“Appellant contends equitable estoppel bars respondents from relying on his consent to the adoption as a basis to deny him the ‘benefits’ of the donor agreement. To the extent he contends those ‘benefits’ include his right to establish himself as a legal parent, we disagree. The donor agreement did not give appellant any right to legal parentage. In fact, it did the opposite.”
She added:
“Appellant concedes the adoption was in N.’s best interest and maintains he is not challenging the adoption order. But he is. The adoption order terminated his parental rights, and his current petition seeks to establish parental rights. California law does not allow him to attack the validity of an order he consented to more than a decade ago. Permitting such an attack would…infringe on public policy favoring ‘expediency and finality’ in adoptions.”
The justice declared:
“Even having played an important fatherly role for most of N.’s life, appellant remains a legal nonparent. Except for grandparents’ right to petition for visitation under section 3104, a nonparent has no standing to initiate an action for visitation under the Family Code.”
The case is C.C. v. L.B., 2024 S.O.S. 3732.
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