Page 1
Denial of Need-Based Attorney Fees Affirmed in Latest Round of Multi-State Custody Case
First District Court of Appeal Says Woman, Who Is Now in Pro Per, Can’t Get What She Didn’t Ask for
By a MetNews Staff Writer
A man, who is the son of the 11th highest-paid chief executive officer of a business in the United States, and who has claimed throughout the course of a much-litigated court battle with a woman he made pregnant during one of their two dates that he is unemployed and can’t afford to contribute to her purported need-based legal fees, has been spared any obligation to do so, at least for now, under a Court of Appeal decision.
Div. Four of the First District, in an unpublished opinion filed Thursday, held that the mother, Kailin Wang, who is now in pro per, was properly denied an award of fees she incurred in connection with her ill-starred defense against a domestic violence restraining order because she “did not clearly request attorney fees” in that proceeding.
The opinion supports the position of Christoffer Stanford Thygesen, father of the boy Wang gave birth to in November 2018. He is the son of Allan Thygesen, CEO of Docusign Inc., whose salary last year was $85,035,380 and who is apparently financing his son’s legal representation.
Litigation over custody and other matters has taken place in California, Utah—where Wang resides—and New York. Thursday’s opinion, authored by Presiding Justice Tracie L. Brown, comes in the 14th appellate court proceeding brought by Wang, who has been declared a vexatious litigant.
The parties—who were identified by their actual names in a .June 29, 2021 partially published opinion from Div. Four—are denominated “C.T.” and “K.W.” by Brown, as they were in in three prior opinions that were not certified for publication. Wang and Christoffer Thygesen met through a dating app when he was 25 and she was 35.
On Nov. 15, 2021, Acting Presiding Justice Stuart R. Pollak wrote for Div. Four in giving Wang a rare victory, declaring that she “may be entitled to attorney fees under Family Code section 7605,” remanding the case for a determination.
That section, a part of the Uniform Parentage Act, says:
“In any proceeding to establish physical or legal custody of a child or a visitation order under this part, and in any proceeding subsequent to entry of a related judgment, the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party, except a government entity, to pay to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.”
In the opinion filed Thursday, Brown said:
“Because the record before us does not establish that [Wang] clearly sought need-based fees to defend herself against allegations of domestic violence at the DVRO hearing based on the argument that section 7605 allowed such fees, she cannot prevail on appeal with such argument.” However, she added: “We wish to emphasize, however, that this opinion does not prohibit, and should not be construed to preclude, [Wang] from bringing an appropriately supported, procedurally compliant motion for attorney fees asking the court to address whether she is entitled to attorney fees under section 7605 to assist her in rebutting the section 3044 presumption in future proceedings in this case.”
Family Code §3044(a) provides:
“Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five years against the other party seeking custody of the child…there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child….”
The opinion affirms a domestic violence restraining order imposed on Wang. Rejecting her contention that §3044 has no applicability to a proceeding under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (“DVPA”), Brown said:
“[T]the section 3044 presumption applies in this case. Although [Thygesen] initiated this matter under the DVPA, when he filed his petition, he also sought a permanent award of sole physical and legal custody of the parties’ child.”
She quoted Pollak’s 2021 opinion as saying that “this domestic violence action has become the proceeding in which custody of the parties’ son is being determined.”
The opinion dismisses Wang’s challenge to custody orders, saying that they are of a temporary nature and not appealable.
The case is C.T. v. K.W., A166854.
Copyright 2024, Metropolitan News Company