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Ninth Circuit:
Immunity Blocks Suit Over Detention of Innocent Woman
Opinion Says Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted to City of Los Angeles in Case Where Plaintiff Spent 12 Days in Custody; Police Had No Knowledge That the Wrong Person Was Named in a No-Bail Indictment
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal held yesterday that the City of Los Angeles is immune from liability for the arrest and 12-day jailing of an innocent woman who was apprehended based on a no-bail warrant because officers acted reasonably, unaware that a grand jury in the State of Texas had indicted the woman by mistake.
The plaintiff’s name is Bethany Kaley Farber and the person who actually committed vandalism is Bethany Gill Farber. The detained woman is described in the complaint as “young…with long, blonde hair” and the proper subject of the warrant is “older with short brown hair.”
On Feb. 22, 2022, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the city for damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and various state-law causes of action based on her detention in the Lynwood Women’s Jail from April 16, 2021 through April 26, 2021. The complaint alleges that while she was waiting for a flight to Mexico out of Los Angeles International Airport when she was apprehended and detained.
She also alleges that, due to the detention, her grandmother had a stress-induced stroke and died shortly after the plaintiff was released from custody.
District Court Judge Otis D. Wright II of the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the city as to all claims and ordered entry of final judgment on May 24, 2023.
Wright’s View
Farber asserts claims under §1983 based on alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful seizure and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.
Wright noted that “[a]n arrest is considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and is reasonable when supported by probable cause” and that “[p]robable cause is measured by an objective standard based on the information known to the arresting officer.”
He opined:
“Here, Farber was the true subject of the Warrant….The Warrant listed Farber’s exact identifying information down to the detail and did not deviate by one inch or pound. Thus,…the arresting officers here were not unreasonable in believing that Farber was the true warrant subject at the time of the arrest.”
The judge found that her Fourteenth Amendment due process claim fails for the same reason.
He rejected her assertion that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the police officers who booked her did not follow established protocol, providing that an officer must have attended “supervisor school” before offering booking advice. Wright said that “[e]ven accepting Farber’s assertion as true, a department policy does not establish constitutional rights.”
He concluded:
“[T]he City is immune from civil liability stemming from the mistaken arrest and detention….[T]here is no factual question whether the officers had a reasonable belief that Farber was the person named in the Warrant, and the jail personnel were entitled as a matter of law to rely on process and orders apparently valid on their face…Accordingly, the officers may invoke these immunities to avoid the liability alleged, and the City may as well.”
Ninth Circuit’s View
A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the judgment in a memorandum opinion by Circuit Judges Morgan Christen and Lawrence VanDyke and Senior Circuit Judge William A. Fletcher.
The panel said that “Farber’s § 1983 claims fail because she has not shown that a policy, custom, or practice of the City caused her injury…or that the City was deliberately indifferent to her constitutional rights.”
They remarked:
“Farber argues the City has a de facto policy of allowing non-supervisory officers to provide booking advice in violation of the written policy of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). But no reasonable jury could find that the non-supervisory rank of the officer who advised on Farber’s booking was the ‘actionable cause’ of her arrest and detention….Instead, the undisputed evidence shows Farber was arrested and detained because she was mistakenly indicted in Texas.”
The jurists continued:
“Farber’s § 1983 claims also fail because she has not shown an underlying constitutional violation. Her arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the arresting officers ‘had a good faith, reasonable belief that [Farber] was the subject of the warrant.’….The Texas court issued the warrant for Farber, and her identifying information and physical descriptors matched the warrant exactly. Farber’s protestations of innocence, without more, did not make the officers’ beliefs unreasonable.”
They added that “[t]he Superior Court had already ordered Farber detained when the LAPD received pictures from Texas that might have called the correctness of the indictment into question” and said that Wright did not err in holding that the city was immune from liability because “[t]he arresting officers reasonably believed Farber was the subject of a valid warrant” and were entitled to rely on a facially valid order.
The case is Farber v. City of Los Angeles, 23-55541.
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