Metropolitan News-Enterprise

 

Monday, October 7, 2024

 

Page 4

 

Court of Appeal:

Statutory Presumption Does Not Require Finding Low-Term Sentence Indefensible

Opinion Says Law Favoring Lower Sentences for Victims of Abuse May Be Overcome Without Showing Imposition of Base Would Be ‘Irrational’

 

By a MetNews Staff Writer

 

Div. One of this district’s Court of Appeal held in an opinion that was certified for publication on Friday that legislation providing that the low-term sentence must be imposed upon a showing that the defendant has experienced abuse may be overcome by showing aggregating factors outweigh mitigating ones and no additional finding that the imposition of the minimum penalty would be “indefensible” is required.

At issue is Penal Code §1170(b)(6), enacted in 2022 following the passage of Assembly Bill 124. It provides:

“[U]nless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if…[t]he person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.”

Appealing his judgment of conviction was Romeo Knowles, a 23-year-old homeless man who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after he attacked a shelter worker named William Bullock, causing the victim to fall, hit his head, and die.

Packet of Materials

Prior to sentencing, the defense provided Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Drew E. Edwards with a packet that included reports from two psychologists—Kevin Booker and Haig J. Kojian—indicating that the defendant suffers from either schizophrenia or a mood disorder. It contained evidence that Knowles was sexually abused by a teacher and suffered the loss of his father at age seven due to a fatal shooting.

On Jan. 12, 2023, Edwards sentenced the defendant to the mid-term of six years in prison, finding that the aggravating factors in the case—including Bullock’s vulnerability and Knowles’ minimization of the crime—outweighed Knowles’ lack of a criminal record and relatively young age, which were offered in mitigation.

On appeal, Knowles asserts that, under §1170(b)(6), a court must find that the aggravating circumstances so outweigh the mitigating factors that the imposition of a low-term sentence would be “irrational” or “indefensible,” arguing that otherwise the presumption would be meaningless and the legislative phrase “contrary to the interests of justice” would be surplusage.

Justice Gregory J. Weingart wrote the opinion, initially filed Sept. 16 and not certified for publication, affirming the judgment of conviction. Acting Presiding Justice Helen I. Bendix and San Luis Obispo Superior Court Judge Michael Kelley, sitting on assignment, joined in the opinion.

Statutory Construction

Looking to the terms of §1170(b)(6), Weingart said:

“Knowles seeks to re-write the statute. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) plainly states that the court may sentence above the low term if the aggravating circumstances ‘outweigh the mitigating’ ones such that ‘imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.’ This language is unambiguous….The statute does not say, and does not require, imposition of a low term sentence in every circumstance except those where it would be ‘irrational or indefensible.’ ”

He continued:

“Nor does the statute require the aggravating factors not just outweigh the mitigating factors but also outweigh them by some undefined additional quantum of proof. The record here shows the court correctly understood the scope of its sentencing discretion under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).”

Knowles points to the 2024 California Supreme Court decision in People v. Walker, written by Justice Joshua P. Groban, as offering support for his interpretation.

In the Walker case, the high court said that Penal Code §1385—allowing for the dismissal of enhancements and providing that the presence of certain mitigating circumstances “weighs greatly in favor of dismissing”—requires that a court assign “significant value” to the “enumerated mitigating circumstances” cited by a defendant.

Knowles argues that §1385 is in pari materia—meaning “of the same matter” or “on the same subject”—with §1170 and the court should import the language, as construed by Walker, regarding mitigating factors deserving great weight into the sentencing statute at issue in his case.

In Pari Materia

Weingart acknowledged that different statutes are construed together as a single piece of legislation if they stand in pari materia with one another. However, the justice said that “where the same subject is treated in several acts having different objects the statutes are not in pari materia.”

Turning to the two sentencing statutes, he reasoned:

“Although at a high level of generality the subject matter of both statutes involves sentencing, sections 1385 and 1170 are not in pari materia because they do not have the same object or purpose and were enacted for different ends. One governs the dismissal of enhancements, the other which level of a sentencing triad will be imposed. Further, the two statutes take very different approaches to their distinct objects and purposes. Both list specific mitigating factors; those lists have some overlap but also meaningful differences.”

He added:

“[W]hen two statutes are not in pari materia, which given their myriad differences sections 1170 and 1385 are not, we do not construe their unrelated provisions together….We decline to read into the statutory language of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) terms that it does not contain in its explanation of how the court is to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances from an unrelated statute governing the dismissal of enhancements that lacks a similar presumption and provides a different procedure for weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”

Statements to Victim

Knowles contends that Edwards’ statements to Bullock’s family at sentencing showed a judicial bias against sentencing him to the low term. Addressing the family, Edwards said:

“If I were to impose the most severe sentence I could possibly think of, that wouldn’t bring your love[d] one back. It seems like he was a very great man and I am very sorry….I can pretty much tell the Bullock family the sentence I am going to impose is not a sentence that will make you happy. The law simply doesn’t allow me to give a sentence which would make you happy or satisfied.”

Unpersuaded by Knowles’ assertion, Weingart said:

“The court did not say it would not follow the law. It expressly stated to the contrary, and conveyed to the victim’s family that, regardless of whether it imposed the low term or the midterm, it understood the family might consider the sentence imposed insufficient given their loss. We decline to read this gesture of sympathy towards a grieving family as a sub rosa statement that the court would disregard the applicable law.”

The case is People v. Knowles, B328439.

 

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