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Ninth Circuit:
District Court Lacked Jurisdiction in Habeas Corpus Case
Panel Says Prisoner in Facility That Does Not Lie in Northern District of California Can’t Bring Petition There
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held yesterday that the District Court for the Northern District of California lacked jurisdiction to grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the petitioner is incarcerated in the Eastern District of California and because he named as the respondent U.S. Attorney General Merrick B. Garland and others rather than the warden of the institution where he is incarcerated.
District Court Judge James Donato of the Northern District of California erred in denying the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit said, directing that an order conditionally granting habeas relief be vacated.
The petitioner, denominated in the opinion “John Doe,” insisted that he sued in the right court and did name the person under whose authority he is incarcerated. He declared that he is “presently detained under the authority of the Acting Director of the San Francisco Field Office” and named that person, and her successor when she left the post, as respondents along with Garland and others.
Doe was detained on July 12, 2021, as a criminal alien awaiting deportation. On jurisdiction June 24, 2022, Doe a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking a bond hearing.
Cites Own Decision
On Sept. 13, 2022, Donato rejected the government’s motion for a dismissal, quoting his own Oct. 14, 2021 opinion in Meneses v. Jennings as saying:
“The Court has concluded in prior immigration habeas cases that the Northern District of California is an appropriate jurisdiction for petitions filed by aliens detained by the Director of the San Francisco ICE Field Office.”
In denying the government’s motion in Doe’s case, Donato said:
“The government does not cite any intervening, controlling authority that would compel a different outcome here or undermine the Court’s reasoning in Meneses.”
On Jan. 23, 2024, Donato declared:
“The government is ordered to release Doe from custody or, within 31 days of the date of this order, provide him with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge, where the government will bear the burden to show that Doe’s continued detention is justified by clear and convincing evidence….If the immigration judge’s decision is not issued within 14 days of the bond hearing, Doe must be released from detention.”
In a footnote, he said: “Doe’s request to proceed under pseudonym…is granted. Doe has demonstrated that maintaining his anonymity is necessary to protect him from physical harm.”
In yesterday’s decision reversing the order, District Court Judge Yvette Kane of the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation, noted Donato’s reliance on Meneses, as well as an earlier decision (also by Donato). She observed, in a footnote, that “[l]ater decisions from other district courts in the Northern District reveal an inconsistent approach to the jurisdictional question raised here.”
Supreme Court Decision
Kane pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Rumsfeld v. Padilla. There, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for the majority in holding that a habeas corpus petition was incorrectly filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York given that the detainee was in military confinement in South Carolina.
Rehnquist noted that 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a) provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.”
He said that “for core habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.”
Petitioner Jose Padilla should have named as respondent Melanie A. Marr, commander of the Consolidated Naval Brig—where Padilla was incarcerated—rather than Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, the chief justice said. He wrote:
“The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the proper respondent is ‘the person’ having custody over the petitioner….Its consistent use of the definite article indicates that there is generally only one proper respondent, and the custodian is ‘the person’ with the ability to produce the prisoner’s body before the habeas court….[L]ongstanding federal-court practice confirms that, in ‘core’ habeas challenges to present physical confinement, the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.”
Kane said in yesterday’s opinion:
“The Padilla district of confinement and immediate custodian rules are firmly entrenched in the law of this and other circuits.”
She set forth: “Padilla set forth a clear rule requiring core habeas petitioners challenging their present physical confinement to name their immediate custodian, the warden of the facility where they are detained, as the respondent to their petition….Doe did not adhere to this requirement in failing to name the Facility Administrator, who was the de facto warden of GSA. in his petition. Accordingly, the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over Doe’s petition.”
Kane added:
“The district court’s exercise of jurisdiction was also improper because Doe was confined in the Eastern District of California, not the Northern District of California, where his petition was filed.”
Doe Draws Distinction
Doe argued that his situation is different from that in Padilla because he was seeking a bond hearing, not his release. Kane responded:
“Doe’s argument is counterintuitive and against the great weight of Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority.”
She pointed out that where remedial action is sought, courts often grant conditional release, with release to occur only if relief is denied. The jurist quoted the U.S. Supreme Court as saying in its 1993 opinion in Herrera v. Collins that “typical relief granted in federal habeas corpus is a conditional order of release,” and said:
“Accordingly, Doe seeks ‘typical habeas relief’ in asking for his release should Respondents fail to provide him with an individualized bond hearing.”
Eastern District’s Caseload
Doe stressed the high caseload and understaffing in the Eastern District of California. arguing that filing there could lead to a long delay in gaining a bond hearing. Kane said:
“But here, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and the related statutory provisions governing habeas petitions set the jurisdictional rules. Of course, there are prudential concerns with Doe’s position as well, such as the possibility of forum shopping and the uncertainty created by multiple possible jurisdictions where a § 2241 petition could be filed. But even crediting Doe’s concerns for docket delay and congestion, it is the job of Congress, not this court, to address those concerns through appropriate legislation.”
The case is Doe v. Garland, 23-15361.
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