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C.A. Won’t Repudiate Case Interpreting Juvenile Resentencing Statute
Opinion Says Prosecution Failed to Give Compelling Reason to Overturn Precedent Holding That Section, Which Applies to Sentences of Life Without Parole, Is Applicable to ‘Functional Equivalent’ Terms
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal yesterday affirmed an order calling for the release of a prisoner who had been convicted of second-degree murder in the shooting death of an 11-year-old boy on a middle-school campus in 2006, when the defendant was 15 years old, declining an invitation by the prosecutor to revisit the resentencing scheme that prompted the ruling.
At issue is an interplay between case law and recent legislation described by the court as “a seismic shift in the law governing juvenile punishment.”
Sec. 1170(d), as amended in 2013, provides that “when a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
The following year, the Legislature amended §3051 to add subd. (b)(4) which affords juveniles sentenced to life without parole youth offender parole hearings during the 25th year of incarceration.
In 2022, Div. One expanded the reach of §1170(d) in People v. Heard, finding that the Equal Protection Clause mandates the extension of the benefits of the section to juveniles sentenced to the “functional equivalent” of life without parole—in that case, a defendant sentenced to 103 years to life. Seeking release was James Bagsby, convicted and sentenced in 2010 to a prison term of 107 years to life. After more than 15 years of incarceration, Bagsby filed a petition for recall and resentencing under §1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the “functional equivalent” of life without parole under Heard. The San Bernardino District Attorney’s Office opposed the petition, arguing that Heard was “improperly decided” and that the consequences of granting the position would be dire.
The prosecution pointed out that Senate Bill 1391, enacted in 2018, repeals the authority of a district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to criminal court if the crime was committed when the defendant was under 16, and—as Bagsby is now an adult—no juvenile remedies would be available.
San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Annemarie Pace declined to disregard Heard and said that “the consequence of following the law is not an argument not to adhere to the law this court is obligated to follow.” Pace declared that, given Bagsby is outside the bounds of juvenile court jurisdiction, “is ordered released from custody on these charges.”
Acting Presiding Justice Truc T. Do authored the opinion affirming the release, saying:
“The People offer three reasons why we should reconsider Heard. But because Heard is a decision of this court, the People must provide us with a compelling reason to depart from it….[T]hey fail to do so.”
Justices Jose S. Castillo and David M. Rubin joined in the opinion.
Meaningful Opportunity
Robert James Luby, with the San Bernardino District Attorney’s Office, pointed to California Supreme Court jurisprudence finding that a juvenile life sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment after the enactment of §3051 because the offender now has a meaningful opportunity for release. He contends that this holding means that Bagsby is no longer subject to a sentence that is the “functional equivalent” of life without parole.
Unpersuaded, Do noted that “[w]e considered and rejected this very argument in Heard.”
The prosecution further argues that the enactment of 3051 gave the Legislature a rational basis for the differential treatment of juvenile offenders serving the “functional equivalent” of life sentences from those serving life without the possibility of parole.
Do said the argument is forfeited because “[t]he People have asserted it for the first time in reply” but found the contention “unpersuasive” in any event. She wrote:
“The People’s point appears to be that for at least some period of time after section 3051 was initially enacted, a juvenile sentenced to an explicitly designated life without parole term was ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing, whereas a juvenile like Bagsby whose lengthy sentence included a life term of 25 years to life was eligible for a youth offender parole hearing….They portray this as a difference that justified the Legislature in limiting the scope of the section 1170(d) resentencing provision. But the People ignore that the resentencing provision was enacted before, not after, section 3051. When section 1170(d) was enacted, there was no disparity in the availability of youth offender parole hearings because they did not exist.”
She continued:
“Furthermore, as the People acknowledge, the Legislature has now ‘exten[ded] section 3051’ to grant youth offender parole hearings to juveniles with life without parole sentences….They assert that youth offender parole hearings are now available to ‘all minors sentenced as adults.’ They therefore fail to identify an existing, plausible reason for the disparity in the section 1170(d) resentencing provision, and accordingly they do not provide a compelling reason for us to disagree with Heard.”
Equal Protection
Luby’s “first and primary contention on appeal is that we should reconsider the remedy for the equal protection violation,” arguing that §1170(d) is unconstitutional based on Heard and asking the court to strike it down instead of expanding it, the Do recited.
She remarked:
“It is true that ‘[w]hen a court concludes that a statutory classification violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, it has a choice of remedies.’ However, in making that choice we must be guided by the Legislature’s preference….
“The People fail to demonstrate that the remedy they urge us to adopt is the one the Legislature would prefer….They…express the view that deleting the provision would be ‘fitting’ because ‘there exists another law, [section 3051, subdivision (b)(4)], which has been found to conform to current case law, and largely fulfills the legislative purpose of [section 1170(d)(1)(A)].’ ”
The jurist opined:
“Had the Legislature truly preferred for…the amendment of section 3051[] to result in the elimination of subdivision (d)(1)(A) from section 1170, it could have done so itself….But it did not.”
She added:
“In addition, because the People have brought their request to strike the resentencing provision more than two years after we decided Heard, we have additional evidence of legislative intent in the Legislature’s response to Heard. Since 2022, when Heard was decided, the Legislature has continued to amend section 1170….Had the Legislature preferred for the equal protection violation we identified in Heard to be remedied by striking subdivision (d)(1)(A) from section 1170, it could have accomplished that result itself. Instead, it has left the provision intact.”
The case is People v. Bagsby, 2024 S.O.S. 3654.
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