Page 3
C.A. ‘Troubled’ by Lack of Effort to Ascertain Juror Consent
Opinion Says Judge Should Have Taken Additional Steps to Determine if Panelists, Who Failed to Respond to Request for Release of Their Information, Objected to Disclosure
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
Div. Three of this district’s Court of Appeal held Friday that a trial judge erred in denying a convicted murderer’s petition for the release of juror information in order to conduct misconduct investigations—based on alleged statements by one panelist indicating that she had instructed the panel on the meaning of “intent” based on her own legal training—where 11 members never objected to the release after being notified of the request.
Only one juror responded to a notice of the petition sent by Central Juror Services objecting to the release based on a contentious atmosphere during the trial that caused one panelist to request that the jury be brought into the courtroom during breaks and the court offering to have jurors escorted to their cars after the verdict.
The petition for release was made under Code of Civil Procedure §237 which provides for a hearing on the petition if the supporting declaration establishes a “prima facie showing of good cause.” If a hearing is set, the section requires “notice to each affected former juror by personal service or first-class mail” and specifies:
“After the hearing, the records shall be made available as requested in the petition, unless a former juror’s protest to the granting of the petition is sustained. The court shall sustain the protest of the former juror if, in the discretion of the court, the petitioner fails to show good cause, the record establishes the presence of a compelling interest against disclosure [such as threats or danger of physical harm], or the juror is unwilling to be contacted by the petitioner.”
No Response
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Olivia Rosales noted that it was “crucial to know whether or not [the jurors] were advised that by not responding [to the letter] it would be taken as there is no objection,” but no further mention was made of the contents of the letter when the judge later ruled against disclosure.
Justice Anne H. Egerton authored the unpublished opinion, joined in by Presiding Justice Lee Edmon and Justice Rashida A. Adams, conditionally reversing the judgment and remanding for reconsideration of the petition. Egerton said:
“We…are troubled by the trial court’s apparent failure to consider the content of the letters that Central Juror Services sent to the jurors. The court noted it was ‘crucial’ to review the letters before ruling on the petition. As the trial court seemed to recognize, it is possible the letters told the jurors that failure to protest the petition would be construed as consent to the disclosure of their information. If so, it is possible some of the jurors failed to respond because they were willing to have Johnson contact them to talk about the case.”
Arguing that the denial of his petition for release was an abuse of discretion was Jeffrey Johnson, who was convicted of the 2018 first-degree murder of Maurice Elston. Johnson’s son had a child with Elston’s sister, leading to a dispute over the child which escalated into a physical brawl during which the defendant fatally stabbed the decedent.
Statements by Foreperson
According to a declaration filed by Johnson’s attorney, the foreperson told the lawyer that the jurors were split on whether Johnson, who claimed self-defense, intended to kill Elston. The foreperson allegedly said that she then “explained that she had some training and experience in the law, and…advised the…hold-outs that ‘intent’ had a different meaning under the law than it does in ‘real life’ ” and provided her own explanation of the term.
After her explanation, the foreperson purportedly claimed that the three hold-outs changed their votes to guilty. The prosecutor, who was present for the conversation, disputed some of the claims in the declaration and objected to the release of the jurors’ information.
Rosales initially denied the petition without a hearing. In an unpublished 2022 decision, Div. Three reversed and directed the court to set a hearing on the matter, finding that Johnson had made a prima facia showing of good cause. On remand, Rosales again denied the petition after a hearing.
The judge said that the protesting juror’s letter reminded her of the contentious atmosphere during the trial and concluded that “given the totality of how this trial went…and how the jury felt,…the court feels that there is [a] compelling interest against disclosure and the court will deny the request to disclose the jurors’ identifying information.”
Johnson’s Interpretation
Johnson argued that §237 requires a trial court to disclose information for every juror who does not protest a petition, regardless of whether the record shows a compelling interest against disclosure. Unpersuaded, Egerton said:
“[Sec. 237] states if the court sustains a juror’s protest to the granting of a petition, the court may decline to disclose the ‘records…as requested in the petition.’….The statute does not specify that those records must concern the juror who protested the petition. Nor does it state that, after sustaining a protest, the court must disclose the records of non-protesting jurors. Accordingly, under a plain and commonsense reading of the statute, if a court sustains a single juror’s protest, it may decline to disclose any or all records requested in the petition.”
She continued:
“Under Johnson’s proposed interpretation…if a single juror protests a petition and provides credible information showing all the jurors are in imminent danger of physical harm from the petitioner, the court would be powerless to withhold information for the non-protesting jurors. The court would be required to disclose information for jurors who did not protest because they were not aware of the danger, as well as jurors who never received actual notice of the petition….We are confident the Legislature did not intend to mandate that courts disclose juror information under those circumstances, as it would contravene the Legislature’s stated goal of protecting jurors’ safety and wellbeing.”
Abuse of Discretion
The jurist wrote that “[a]lthough we reject Johnson’s interpretation of section 237, we agree with him that the trial court abused its discretion by finding a compelling interest against disclosure of the non-protesting jurors’ information.”
She remarked:
“The trial court did not identify the specific compelling interest against disclosure that justified its refusal to disclose information for the non-protesting jurors. However, from its remarks at the hearing, it seems the court believed disclosing the non-protesting jurors’ information would expose those jurors to a risk of physical harm, threats, or harassment….In support of its decision, the court cited the contentious atmosphere at trial and….noted the non-protesting jurors likely witnessed the incidents described in the protesting juror’s letter. From this, the court seemed to infer that the non-protesting jurors shared the protesting juror’s concerns about the release of their information.”
Egerton continued:
“We acknowledge the court may have been concerned that some jurors did not receive actual notice of the petition or failed to understand its significance. If so…those jurors’ failure to protest would not reflect their consent to the release of their information or a willingness to talk about the case. Nevertheless, to the extent the court had any doubts about the non-protesting jurors’ intentions, it should have made more of an effort to contact them….Given the significant rights at stake—including Johnson’s right to an unbiased jury and the jurors’ absolute right to discuss the deliberations and verdict —at the very least, the court should have sent the jurors a second letter or tried to contact them by telephone.”
Letters to Jurors
Turning to the Central Juror Services letters, she commented:
“Despite the significance of the letters, the trial court did not mention them at the hearing on Johnson’s petition. Nor do they appear in the trial court’s case file or the record on appeal. Given their complete absence in the record of the hearing, it is reasonable to infer the trial court did not consider the letters before ruling on Johnson’s petition. The court’s failure to do so undermines the reliability of its inference that the non-protesting jurors shared the protesting juror’s concerns. It also raises the possibility that the court refused to release information for jurors who were willing to talk to Johnson about the case.”
Egerton added:
“We also remind the trial court that, even if there are legitimate reasons not to disclose juror information, the ‘duty to protect jurors from overzealous attorneys and investigators does not require an abdication of the court’s obligation to ensure that the jury trial process is free from misconduct.’….Nor does it preclude the court from exploring other options that would give Johnson access to vital information while ensuring the jurors’ safety and confidentiality. For example, the court could act as an intermediary between the jurors and the defense by requiring all communications take place through the court clerk….The court also could provide access to a shared telephone line, video conferencing service, or meeting room. Or, if necessary, the court could order the jurors to appear and testify at a hearing….We appreciate that this would inconvenience the jurors and the court. However, in the face of such serious allegations of juror misconduct, the inconvenience may be necessary to ensure Johnson received a fair trial.”
The case is People v. Johnson, B325013.
Copyright 2024, Metropolitan News Company