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Court of Appeal:
Prosecutor’s Exclusion of Juror Who Admitted Favoring Hispanics Mandates Reversal
Opinion Says Deputy D.A.’s Proffered Reason Was Insufficient Because He Described Potential Panelist’s Statement as ‘Unprompted,’ Which Was Unsupported by Record
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal yesterday reversed the first-degree murder conviction of a Hispanic defendant due to the prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge to a prospective juror who said she “can be biased toward Hispanics,” with the justices holding that the deputy district attorney’s explanation that the remark was “unprompted” was not supported by substantial evidence.
The appeal centered on Code of Civil Procedure §231.7, enacted as part of the Racial Justice Act of 2020, which provides that “[a] party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.”
Under subdivision (d) of the section, reasons that are not listed as “presumptively invalid” are evaluated under a substantial likelihood standard as to whether the proffered justification was a proxy for racial discrimination. The analysis is to take into account a non-exhaustive list of factors including whether the stated reason for the “peremptory challenge was contrary to or unsupported by the record.”
The statute provides:
“Should the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.”
Appealing his conviction was Zenaido Valdivia-Guzman, who was found guilty of murder by a jury on Nov. 15, 2022. Orange Superior Court Judge Shiela F. Hanson sentenced Valdivia-Guzman to life in prison.
Voir Dire
During voir dire, a panelist identified as “Prospective Juror Number 108” said she “tended to be softer towards Hispanics” but said, upon further questioning, that she would “follow the law” and treat the defendant and all witnesses “the same as anybody else” despite feelings of empathy toward Latinos.
Hanson denied the prosecutor’s motion to excuse Juror 108 for cause, expressing concern about the potential panelist’s stated bias but concluding that “[s]he did ultimately say she would follow the law.” The prosecutor used his first peremptory challenge to remove that prospective panelist.
Valdivia-Guzman objected, citing §231.7 and arguing that the venireperson was being dismissed for being Hispanic. The prosecutor responded with his reasons for the dismissal, saying:
“[T]he second thing out of her mouth—and it might have been the very first thing out of her mouth—was I have a bias, either for or against Hispanics. And it wasn’t in response to a question posed by the court, the form that’s been given to the jurors, or by the prosecution.
“So it was clearly something that this individual felt was so important to them that they would say it immediately and unprompted.
“That causes the People concern that the juror can’t sit as a fair juror and won’t be willing to listen to some of the evidence, and won’t be able to separate her sympathy or empathy that she then later discussed in the afternoon when the People began questioning her.”
The prosecutor also cited her quiet demeanor and tendency to provide one-word answers as additional reasons for the challenge.
Finding the proffered reasons to be credible, Hanson overruled the defense objection and excused Juror 108. The jury ultimately included four Hispanics, four Caucasians, two Asians, one Asian Indian, and one Filipino or Pacific Islander.
Justice Thomas A. Delaney wrote the unpublished opinion reversing the judgment and remanding for a new trial based on a violation of §231.7. Acting Presiding Justice Eileen C. Moore and Justice Maurice Sanchez joined in the opinion.
Consideration of Reasons
Delaney noted that, under §231.7(j), an “appellate court is to consider only those reasons actually given by the trial court and may ‘not speculate as to…reasons that were not given to explain…the…use of the peremptory challenge….’ ”
Turning to the justification offered by the prosecutor, he said:
“Here, the prosecutor proffered two reasons for his peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror Number 108. First, the prosecutor was concerned the prospective juror would not be a ‘fair juror and won’t be willing to listen to some of the evidence, and won’t be able to separate her sympathy or empathy’ because she stated she was biased in favor of Hispanics. Her statement of bias was ‘if not the very first thing out of her mouth, the second thing out of her mouth.’ Additionally, ‘….it was clearly something that this individual felt was so important to them that they would say it immediately and unprompted.’ ”
He continued:
“Second, her demeanor and the manner in which she responded to the prosecutor’s questioning indicated she would not be able to be a fair juror, notwithstanding her assertion she would follow the law. The prosecutor stated: ‘When the People questioned her in the afternoon, her responses were very quiet and very much one-word answers….[T]he People felt that she was only parroting what she had heard the court say earlier which is, you’ve got to eliminate bias to be a juror, but that her actual answers and opinions differed from that.’ ”
Bias Statement
Addressing the potential juror’s stated bias in favor of Hispanics, the justice said:
“[N]o substantial evidence supports the claim that her bias statement was ‘unprompted.’ The record indicates she made the statement in response to the trial court’s question about whether she could assess witness credibility fairly and impartially. The immediacy of her statement merely reflects her prompt response to the court’s question and does not suggest her bias was ‘so important’ to her that it would prevent her from fulfilling her duties as a juror. Thus, this reason does not support the exercise of the peremptory challenge.”
Delaney pointed out that “[t]he prosecutor’s second reason is presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (g)” which lists a problematic demeanor as one of the justifications that has “historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection.”
He explained that “[t]o rebut the presumption of invalidity, the trial court must confirm the demeanor or manner, and the prosecutor must explain how the demeanor or manner ‘matters to the case to be tried.’ ” In the present case, he concluded:
“The record does not show the prospective juror was hesitant to ‘provide answers.’ Although she gave some one-word answers, those responses were appropriate to the questions, and more importantly, most of her responses were not one word answers….As for speaking quietly, the record does not show whether the prospective juror was speaking quietly. In any case, it is unclear why speaking quietly would indicate the prospective juror would not follow the law, and the prosecutor offered no explanation.”
The jurist declared:
“The prosecutor’s proffered reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror Number 108 are not supported by substantial evidence. Without any valid reason to exercise the peremptory challenge, the trial court erred by overruling defense counsel’s objection under section 231.7.”
The case is People v. Valdivia-Guzman, G062516.
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