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California Supreme Court:
Defendant’s Culpability Properly Considered in Dismissal
Jenkins
Says Innocent State of Mind May Be Weighed as to ‘Interests of Justice’ Even in
Strict Liability Case
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The California Supreme Court yesterday decided that a court commissioner did not err in considering a criminal defendant’s innocent state of mind in dismissing misdemeanor charges against her when the charges were premised on municipal law that permitted noncriminal sanctions for the least culpable violators, even though the charges imposed strict liability and did not require a finding of criminal intent.
The opinion for the unanimous court was authored by Justice Martin J. Jenkins and reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeal for this district denying a petition for a writ of mandate directing the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles Superior Court to set aside its opinion reversing a dismissal of the defendant’s case under Penal Code §1385.
The City of Los Angeles charged 85-year-old defendant Emily Wheeler with violating two subdivisions of Municipal Code §104.15, one targeting “unlicensed Commercial Cannabis Activity” and the other targeting “Unlawful Establishments” operating without a license. She was also charged with violating Municipal Code §12.21(A)(1)(a) which prohibits using land for a licensed activity without obtaining a license.
Her son was also charged in the complaint with the same violations but was not a party to the appeal.
Motion to Dismiss
Wheeler filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the municipal sections were vague and overbroad, and referenced a court’s authority to dismiss an action on its own motion in furtherance of justice, “respectfully invit[ing]” the court to dismiss on that basis.
The moving papers noted that the elderly defendant merely owned the premises at issue and lacked a “direct or even indirect connection” to or knowledge of any cannabis enterprise occurring on her property. Wheeler appeared at the hearing in a wheelchair.
Her attorney provided a statement in which he “declare[d] under penalty of perjury” that the facts favoring dismissal were “true and correct.”
The city opposed dismissal, arguing that Penal Code §1385 does not authorize a defense-initiated motion to dismiss and that dismissal would not further the interests of justice. The prosecution argued that the strict liability nature of the offenses made her lack of knowledge irrelevant and a dismissal would interfere with the city’s ability to “mitigate the negative impacts” of unregulated commercial sales of cannabis.
Commissioner H. Elizabeth Harris denied the defense motion but granted dismissal on its own motion under §1385, citing not only her age and exemplary record but also the absence of anything “to suggest that she knows anything about this, other than the fact that she owns the property.”
In reversing the dismissal, the Appellate Division, in an opinion by Judge Alex Ricciardulli, found that the judge’s consideration of the defendant’s lack of knowledge, in a strict liability crime, amounted to an impermissible disagreement with the law. The Appellate Division “expressed no opinion” on whether the judge may consider other, appropriate considerations in a future motion to dismiss.
Penal Code §1385
Jenkins noted that a court’s power to dismiss a criminal action in the furtherance of justice has been recognized by §1385(a) since the first session of the Legislature in 1850, and “[t]o prevent abuse of the dismissal power, the Legislature requires courts to specify the reasons for dismissal in court minutes for public scrutiny.” The section provides, in relevant part:
“The judge or magistrate may, either on motion of the court or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.”
He explained that the reasons for dismissal must be those which would motivate a reasonable judge and a “limiting principle” has been applied by courts in reviewing dismissals under the section, requiring a court to “consider factors intrinsic to” the statutory or sentencing scheme at issue, such as the nature of the offenses and the defendant’s background and character.
The jurist remarked that “[c]ulpability has, in practice, played a role in our section 1385 cases considering evidence of guilt or the nature of an offense,” but noted that “two decisions from the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One—both from 1972—reversed section 1385 dismissals of charges when guilt was uncontested and the trial court acted on concerns” relating to the impact on a particular defendant.
However, Jenkins said that “these Fourth District decisions stopped short of forbidding consideration of matters such as a defendant’s culpability” and remarked:
“Critically missing from the trial courts’ brief statements of reasons for dismissal in these cases, and thus escaping appellate review, was consideration of the charged conduct’s relationship to the ‘scheme to which the defendant [was] subject’…and, for instance, defendant’s culpability in relation to that scheme.”
He declared:
“[W]e clarify that trial courts may, as appropriate, consider the nature of a charged offense and a defendant’s minimal culpability in weighing all the considerations for and against dismissal in furtherance of justice under section 1385, subdivision (a), whether before or after trial.”
Least Culpable Violator
Jenkins commented:
“To resolve this case, we need not address the full extent of a trial court’s discretion to dismiss a charge under section 1385 based in part on a defendant’s reduced culpability. Nor need we evaluate the correctness of each Court of Appeal decision….[T]he municipal enactments at issue here at most authorize misdemeanor prosecutions and are clear in contemplating noncriminal treatment for the least culpable violators such as Wheeler….[T]his affects how we view the consideration of Wheeler’s mental state as part of the section 1385 dismissal inquiry.”
He pointed out that “[t]hough the municipal provisions authorize treatment of violators as misdemeanants, violators lacking a ‘financial interest’ in the unlicensed cannabis establishment may face only ‘a citation under the City’s Administrative Citation Enforcement Program.’ ”
The justice continued:
“Where, as here, the laws at issue permit noncriminal treatment of the least culpable violators, a dismissal under section 1385 that references a defendant’s minimal, bottom-of-the-spectrum culpability as one of the dismissal considerations does not, simply by doing so, go beyond the justice internal to the laws or evince bare antipathy for them.”
Rejecting the prosecution’s argument that Wheeler’s lack of knowledge could not be properly considered due to the strict liability nature of the offenses, he wrote:
“[A]ny circumstance of a crime, whether or not necessary to prove an element of the crime, might render a defendant less culpable without rendering her innocent. And ‘mitigating’ circumstances, to use the language of the appellate division, are ordinarily thought to include circumstances of the crime itself that, although not proving innocence, lessen culpability.”
Commissioner Had Discretion
Under the circumstances, Jenkins declared:
“Though Wheeler has not disputed her technical violations of the municipal laws, we hold that, given the nature of those laws, the trial court had discretion to consider the nature of the alleged violations and Wheeler’s lack of knowledge in weighing all the considerations for and against dismissal in furtherance of justice under section 1385.”
The justice considered, “for the sake of concluding this case,” whether the trial court failed to act sufficiently on its own motion “in light of Wheeler’s initiating the request for dismissal.”
Finding that it did, he wrote:
“Wheeler did submit a dismissal request, but the request ‘invite[d]’ court action. The trial court expressly denied Wheeler’s request and twice stated it was acting on its own motion and wanted ‘to make that clear.’”
The case is Wheeler v. Appellate Division of Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 2024 S.O.S. 1708.
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