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Thursday, May 2, 2024

 

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Court of Appeal:

Failure to Instruct on ‘Accident’ as a Defense Was Harmless in Vehicular Murder Case

 

By a MetNews Staff Writer

 

Div. Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal held yesterday that any error in failing to give a pinpoint jury instruction on accidental action in a murder case arising out of an excessive-speed car accident was harmless, despite evidence that the defendant hit the brakes before crashing and might have been distracted by discord with his girlfriend.

Justice Thomas A. Delaney wrote the unpublished opinion affirming the judgment of conviction by San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Ingrid Adamson Uhler. Presiding Justice Kathleen E. O’Leary and Justice Martha K. Gooding joined in the opinion.

Appealing his conviction was Jesse Neaves, who drove at approximately 100 miles-per-hour in a 50 miles-per-hour speed limit zone at about 9:30 p.m. on July 6, 2019, before crashing into a vehicle ahead of him which was stopped at a red light. The two women in the parked car were ejected and both died within minutes of the crash, and the deaths were classified as accidental by the forensic pathologist assigned to the case.

Neaves was charged with two counts of murder, and the prosecutor argued that Neaves—who had earlier fought with his girlfriend and said that life “ain’t worth living”—intentionally crashed his car into the victims’ vehicle.

Over prosecution objection, Uhler instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense but declined to instruct on the defense theory of accident. The jury found Neaves guilty of two counts of murder.

Jury Instruction

Neaves argued that Uhler prejudicially erred by not instructing on accidental action. For general or specific intent crimes, CALCRIM No. 3404 provides:

“[T]he defendant is not guilty of [insert crime(s)] if (he/she) acted…without the intent required for that crime, but acted instead accidentally. You may not find the defendant guilty of [insert crime(s)] unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) acted with the required intent.”

Delaney noted that the requested jury instruction does not amount to an affirmative defense but rather relates to a claim that the defendant did not act with the required mental state to make his actions a crime. He said “when the charge is second degree murder” the request is for a “pinpoint instruction” that negates the existence of malice.

The jurist explained:

“If a party requests this pinpoint instruction and sufficient evidence supports the theory of accident, a trial court must provide it.”

The jurist declined to decide whether the instruction was warranted, opining:

“Even if the trial court erred in refusing to give CALCRIM No. 3404, the error was harmless.”

Largely Duplicative

Delaney pointed out that Uhler properly instructed on implied malice, explaining to the jury that Neaves had such a mental state if he intentionally committed the act, the natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life, at the time he acted he knew his act was dangerous to human life, and he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.

The justice reasoned that the murder instructions, coupled with the reasonable doubt instruction, made the accident instruction “largely duplicative.” He said:

“Even though the given instructions did not contain the word ‘accident,’ defense counsel argued six times in closing that Neaves could not be guilty of murder because the crash was an ‘accident.’ The jury was thus made aware of the defense’s theory.”

Delaney found that Uhler’s decision to instruct on involuntary manslaughter, which occurs when a person commits an unlawful killing without the intent to kill or the conscious disregard for human life, made the jury aware that it could find Neaves guilty of “an offense less severe than second degree murder.”

He wrote:

“[The jury] nonetheless found Neaves guilty of second degree murder, and in so finding it rejected the defense theory that he was simply distracted or not paying attention. We thus conclude the jury would not have rendered a more favorable verdict had it been given CALCRIM No. 3404.”

Sufficient Evidence

Neaves asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he acted with implied malice, regardless of the alleged instructional error, because the prosecution failed to show that he was subjectively aware that his conduct was dangerous to human life and that he acted with conscious disregard.

The defendant cited cases in which appellate courts have affirmed implied malice murder convictions where the driver was intoxicated, had prior accidents, or had been previously cited for speeding, arguing that no such factors which would have alerted him to the danger of his conduct were shown at trial.

Delaney rejected the argument, saying that there’s no single approach to deciding vehicular homicide cases and that that the cases must be individually sized up.

Neaves contended that the argument he was having with his girlfriend was so distracting that he did not spot the  car in front of him in time to stop—though he did apply the brakes as soon as he realized he was about the crash. That late effort, the justice said, “might suggest Neaves did not want to kill anyone,” but, he added, in light of the circumstances surrounding Neaves’s driving,” implied malice could still be discerned.

He continued:

“Neaves drove for about half a mile, reaching twice the posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour. Cars ahead were visibly stopped at a red stoplight with their brake lights on….And although Neaves was told to slow down or was asked what he was doing, he was accelerating from about five seconds to less than one second before the collision. He topped out somewhere between 98.3 and 113 miles per hour before pressing on the brake, and he did not swerve to avoid the Hyundai.”

From those facts, Delaney concluded that “the jury could reasonably infer Neaves knew his driving endangered his passengers and others on the road, yet he acted with a conscious disregard for human life.”

The case is People v. Neaves, G063081.

 

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