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Court of Appeal:
Interest on Fee Award Accrues From Date of Latest Order
Segal Says 2022 Decision Reversed 2019 Order, Rendering It Irrelevant for Purpose of Determining Interest
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Seven of the Court of Appeal for this district held yesterday that where an attorney-fee award is made, then reversed on appeal, and a new award is entered on remand, interest on the award accrues from the date of the second order.
Whether interest accrues from the date of the first order or the second, Acting Presiding Justice John L. Segal wrote, “depends on whether our opinion in the prior appeal was a modification (so that interest runs from the first order, which is what the prevailing plaintiff wants) or a reversal (so that interest runs from the second, which is what the defendant wants).”
In his opinion, joined in by Justices Gail Ruderman Feuer and Gonzalo Martinez, he set forth:
“The line between modification and reversal, however, like that (for example) between a mandatory and prohibitory injunction, can be a little blurry. Here, however, we can safely draw that line. Our directions in the prior appeal required the trial court to do more than perform a pure mathematical computation or add or delete a category of fees; the trial court had to exercise its discretion to determine an appropriate award of attorneys’ fees. Therefore, our prior opinion was a reversal, not a modification, which means interest runs from the second attorneys’ fees award.”
The initial attorney-fee award was made by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Stephen P. Pfahler on Sept. 9, 2019. He set fees in favor of plaintiff Renee Vines at $129,540.44.
That award was reversed on Jan. 21, 2022, in an opinion by then-Presiding Justice Dennis M. Perluss, now retired. It was held that Pfahler erred in awarding fees only in connection with Vines’s successful causes of action against his former employer for retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation and not his unsuccessful claims of for race- and age-based discrimination and harassment.
On remand, Pfahler on June 29, 2022, reinstated the $129,540.44 award—or, as he put it, left it “undisturbed”—and ordered payment of an additional $518,161.77. The former employer, O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, paid that sum, including postjudgment interest from the date of the new order.
“Vines’s attorneys, however, wanted more,” Segal recited.
They wanted interest from the date of the initial award in 2019, which would have amounted to $138,454.44.
Rather than asking Pfahler to amend the judgment to specify interest from the earlier date, they filed for and received a renewal of the judgment, specifying a debt of $138,454.44. O’Reilly moved for an order vacating the renewal of judgment.
Pfahler on Jan. 25, 2023, denied the motion, explaining:
“The order increasing the attorney fees constituted a modification: the Court of Appeal specifically found the reward inadequate due to the failure to sufficiently take into account public policy requirements of the “results obtained” criteria on the unsuccessful claims. The increased fee award engaged in no new fact-finding relative to the case, and directly reflects back on the fees incurred in bringing the case to trial, rather than an increase in fees unique to the appellate process.”
Segal’s Opinion
Segal said of the Court of Appeal’s 2022 opinion in the case:
“We did not hold that Vines’s unsuccessful causes of action were (or were not) closely related to or sufficiently factually intertwined with his successful causes of action as a matter of law. We stated the trial court committed legal error by relying on an incorrect reason for concluding the causes of action were not sufficiently related or factually intertwined. We directed the trial court to determine, using the appropriate legal standard, whether the causes of action were related and, if so, to proceed to…decide whether to reduce Vines’s fee award because he achieved only partial or limited success.”
He continued:
“As directed, the trial court conducted further proceedings, allowed the parties to submit briefs, and held a hearing on the amount of the fee award. Vines argued the court should simply undo the 75 percent reduction and award $518,161.77. O’Reilly argued that…the court should reduce Vines’s fee request because he achieved limited success and the case was not complex.”
Segal disagreed with Pfahler’s statement in the order denying O’Reilly’s motion to vacate the renewal of judgment that the judge had “engaged in no new fact-finding” and said:
“[T]he court appears to have incorrectly focused on whether the facts, rather than the fact-finding, were new…The court misunderstood. The issue was not whether Vines incurred any new fees since the first ruling on the motion for attorneys’ fees; the issues was whether…we directed the court to hear new argument, make new factual findings, and determine anew the amount of Vines’ reasonable attorneys’ fees (which is what we did).”
He declared: “[O]ur decision…was a reversal, not a modification.”
In a footnote, Segal noted that renewals of judgments under Code of Civil Procedure §683.110 et. seq. provide for the extension of time for the enforcement of a judgment beyond the general expiration period of 10 years. Segal said:
“Why Vines applied for a renewal of a judgment that was less than a year old is a mystery, a procedural irregularity O’Reilly does not challenge.”
However, as to the challenge to the renewal of judgment at issue, he wrote:
“The renewal of judgment was for additional interest accruing from September 9, 2019. Because Vines was not entitled to that additional interest, the amount of the renewed judgment was incorrect, and the trial court erred in denying O’Reilly’s motion to vacate the renewal of judgment.”
The case is Vines v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, 2024 S.O.S 1421.
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