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California Supreme Court:
Harsher Treatment of One-Strike Youths Is Constitutional
Jenkins Says Exclusion of Certain Sex Offenders From Early Release Scheme for Young Convicts Does Not Violate Equal Protection Even if Those Convicted of Murder May Qualify; Liu Dissents
By Kimber Cooley, associate editor
The California Supreme Court held yesterday that the statutory exclusion of certain sex offenders from early release consideration—under a law designed to give convicts who were convicted of crimes that occurred before their 26th birthday a chance for re-entry into society after serving 15 years in custody—does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The high court determined that the Legislature could rationally conclude that the purposes behind Penal Code §3051, providing for early release hearings for youthful convicts based on a desire to give an opportunity for rehabilitation, would be frustrated by the inclusion of those convicted of certain sex crimes given a legislative determination that the risk of recidivism is high with that category of offenders.
The decision comes by way of an appeal by Jeremiah Williams who asserts that the statute impermissibly excludes him from early release eligibility based on his multiple rape convictions arising from crimes he committed when he was 24 years old.
Williams’ challenge centers on what he claims is the disparate treatment of youths convicted of “one-strike” offenses under Penal Code 667.61—providing sentences of 25 years to life for those convicted of specified sex offenses under certain delineated circumstances—from those convicted of non-special-circumstances murders.
Youths convicted of murder may be eligible for early release under §3051 but those convicted of one-strike offenses are ineligible for consideration under subdivision (h).
Rape Convictions
Williams was convicted of 13 counts relating to the forcible rape of two women in San Diego in August 2016. Then-San Diego Superior Court Judge Kenneth So (now retired) sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 100 years to life plus 86 years.
In 2020, the Div. One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment over his equal protection objections. Justice Martin J. Jenkins authored the opinion for the six-justice majority, affirming.
Jenkins noted that Williams based his appeal on the 2019 decision by the First District Court of Appeal in People v. Edwards, holding that the carve-out in §3051 for one-strike offenders violates the Equal Protection Clause. Jenkins wrote that “we granted review to resolve this split in authority” and declared:
“We conclude that the One Strike exclusion is rationally related to legitimate state interests in addressing recidivism of serious and dangerous sex offenders and setting punishments that are appropriate for the triggering crimes committed under the specified circumstances. Because a plausible basis exists for the Legislature’s differential treatment of One Strike offenders, we may not second-guess whether this decision was wise, fair, or logical.”
Equal Protection
Jenkins noted:
“Defendant’s constitutional challenge to section 3051’s One Strike exclusion is premised on (1) the seriousness of a One Strike offense as compared to that of first degree murder, which is not categorically excluded under section 3051, and (2) the recidivism risk of One Strike offenders when compared to other defendants who are not similarly excluded under section 3051, such as habitual sexual offenders.”
Finding rational bases for the disparate treatment, the jurist reasoned:
“Regarding the One Strike exclusion at issue here, we agree with the Attorney General that the Legislature could rationally exclude One Strike offenders from early parole under section 3051 based on a combination of concerns: the increased risk of recidivism that One Strike offenders pose and the aggravated nature of their offenses. It is true that nothing in section 3051’s legislative history specifically references the reason for the One Strike exclusion. But it is well established that an equal protection claim subject to rational basis review does not rise or fall based on whether lawmakers expressly articulated the purpose they sought to achieve with the challenged legislation.”
He continued:
“The Legislature could rationally conclude, based on its view that a One Strike sex offender’s risk of recidivism is high, that rehabilitation is unlikely, and therefore these offenders would not likely be eligible for parole, much less early parole under section 3051. With this understanding, the Legislature crafted section 3051(h), balancing a young adult’s capacity for growth and rehabilitation against the set of concerns that had prompted the enactment and amendment of the One Strike law and ultimately deciding that those concerns militate against offering the possibility of early parole under section 3051.”
The justice added that “[t]he judgment that One Strike offenders are less amenable to rehabilitation is necessarily a generalization—perhaps not applicable to every person sentenced under the One Strike law—but it is one the Legislature is entitled to make.”
Graham Case
Williams cites the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Graham v. Florida, which held that sentences of life without the possibility of parole are unconstitutional for non-homicide juvenile offenders. The defendant contends that the court made clear in Graham that homicide offenses differ “in a moral sense” from all other offenses in terms of “severity and irrevocability,” arguments which are applicable here.
Rejecting the applicability of Graham, Jenkins wrote:
“Defendant insists that it is irrational to exclude One Strike offenders but not those convicted of murder from early parole consideration because the high court deemed murder not only fundamentally different ‘in a moral sense’ from other serious offenses….This argument based on the comparative seriousness of crimes, however, is premised on concerns relevant in the context of Eighth Amendment challenges to the death penalty and other severe criminal penalties, such as juvenile [sentences of life without the possibility of parole]; such concerns do not necessarily establish whether a Legislature’s classification violates equal protection under a rational basis standard.”
He concluded that “[p]ut another way, the high court did not hold as a matter of constitutional imperative that ‘no crime can be punished more severely than homicide.’ ”
Recidivism Risk
The defendant points to research studies on the recidivism rates of various offenders which he claims support his assertion that young adult one-strike offenders are not more likely to reoffend than other perpetrators.
In response, Jenkins opined:
“These studies illustrate the continuing academic and scientific debate on the issue. We do not opine on any study’s persuasiveness or question any study’s ultimate conclusions. We do note, however, that there is an empirical basis to support the Legislature’s recidivism concerns; this would refute any suggestion that the Legislature adopted the One Strike exclusion based solely on a patently false ‘public perception’ that sex offenders recidivate more than other criminals.”
He remarked that “the Legislature could have rationally concluded—as reflected by the relevant amendments to the One Strike law—that One Strike offenders posed an identified recidivism risk of committing aggravated sex offenses and that allowing these offenders who would likely reoffend to seek early parole would be inconsistent with the rehabilitative goal of section 3051.”
Liu’s Dissent
Justice Goodwin H. Liu dissented, saying:
“The defendant in this case stands convicted of heinous crimes, and public hostility toward sex offenders is palpable in the history of the One Strike law….But public hostility…does not itself supply a rational basis for the Legislature to exclude One Strike offenders from youth offender parole eligibility.”
Liu wrote that “[n]o one disputes that the aggravated sex offenses covered by the One Strike law, including the crimes Williams committed, are abhorrent and deserve harsh punishment” but pointed out that “[a] challenged classification must…serve a legitimate public purpose and reflect a rational policy judgment.”
He concluded:
“In my view, the court’s labored effort to rationalize the One Strike exclusion does not bear fruit. The problem begins—and largely ends—with the Legislature’s express recognition that young adult offenders, whatever their crime, have diminished culpability and are capable of growth and rehabilitation….That being the case, how was it rational for the Legislature to exclude One Strike offenders from youth offender parole eligibility? The court hypothesizes a rationale that fuses concerns about the aggravated nature of One Strike offenses with concerns about recidivism.”
He also took issue with the level of scrutiny applied, commenting:
“Something is awry when the level of vigilance we apply to a law that exempts certain members of the bar but not others from continuing education requirements…is also what we apply to a law that gives young offenders a meaningful opportunity to avoid life imprisonment but denies that opportunity to an especially despised subset. Our case law applying rational basis review has not always been so rigid.”
Justice M. Bruce Smith of the Fifth District Court of Appeal sat by assignment. Justice Kelli Evans did not participate.
The case is People v. Williams, 2024 S.O.S. 3000.
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