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Ninth Circuit:
Deference Must Be Lent Two-Sentence State S.C. Order
Concurring Judge Agrees That Under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Federal Court Must Bow to Adjudication by State Court, but Questions Why a Summary Denial Must Be Accorded Such Weight
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday reversed a District Court’s grant of a writ of habeas corpus to a convicted double-murderer because the requisite deference was not accorded a two-sentence order by the California Supreme Court denying relief, with Judge Salvador Mendoza Jr., in a concurring opinion, expressing “frustration” over the need to bow to state decisions where no reasoning is provided.
Chief Judge Mary H. Murguia authored the opinion reversing the relief accorded by District Court Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the Eastern District of California to San Quentin inmate Jerry Grant Frye who was sentenced to death in 1988. Frye prevailed in the District Court on his claim that his due process rights were breached by virtue of the jury seeing during the trial that he was shackled.
That claim was first raised in a habeas corpus petition to the California Supreme Court which was summarily denied. Murguia noted that “his forty-plus claims have been pending for over two decades,” only one of which—the asserted unconstitutionality of the shackling—being before the Ninth Circuit.
She recited that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court, acting on a habeas corpus petition, ordinarily may not consider a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication. It may do so, she pointed out, only if the adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or [¶](2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
Presumption Applies
The chief judge wrote:
“We do nor address prejudice because we conclude that Frye has not overcome the significant deference owed to an unreasoned state court decision on the merits under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)….We reject the State’s argument that the right to be free from unjustified shackling was not clearly established federal law when the state court denied Frye relief in 2001….But in light of the limited shackling evidence, we cannot say that every fairminded jurist would agree that the state court was unreasonable in denying relief. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings on Frye’s remaining claims.”
Murguia spelled out that “[a] federal court presumes the state court adjudicated a claim on the merits in the absence of any indication to the contrary, and AEDPA deference applies equally to reasoned and unreasoned state court decisions” and speculated that the high court might have reasoned that the shackling was harmless error.
Mendoza commented:
“It’s a strange thing to review and defer to an application of federal law that does not exist. But that is what the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act…tells us to do. When a habeas petitioner calls on our court to review a state court’s summary denial of post-conviction relief, we are required to guess what the state court’s reasoning might have been before we apply 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)….The majority follows that charge and I cannot fault its reasoning or conclusion. I write separately only to register my frustration with the deference that we owe the perfunctory, two-sentence denial at issue in this capital case.”
The jurist noted that a magistrate judge and a District Court judge discerned a constitutional violation and Murguia said, in an opinion joined in by two judges—Kim Wardlaw and himself—that it was a “close call.”
He went on to say:
“We speculate—as we are required to—that the California Supreme Court could have concluded that the shackling error was harmless….Although we acknowledge that this is a close case, we defer to our invented state-court analysis because not every fair-minded jurist would find it objectively unreasonable.
“So this case hinges—as many habeas cases do—on deference. But the question that continues to gnaw at me is this: deference to what? The state court reasoning that we concocted? That can’t be: and yet it is.”
The jurist noted that a magistrate judge and a District Court judge discerned a constitutional violation and Murguia said, in an opinion joined in by two judges—Kim Wardlaw and himself—that it was a “close call.”
Mendoza commented:
“One would think that federal judges’ impressions of the federal issues presented would carry more weight. Yet. we defer to state-court reasoning that never was. That boggles my mind. And I regret that Frye will remain on death row because a hypothetical fair-minded jurist could think that an imaginary harmlessness analysis is reasonable.”
The case is Frye v. Broomfield, 22-99008.
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