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Court of Appeal:
Precommitment Custody Credits Apply to Maximum Term for Juvenile Sentence
Statutory Scheme Does Not Contemplate Reducing Baseline Sentence—Feuer
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Seven of this district’s Court of Appeal has held that a 2023 statute—enacted as part of a realignment of the juvenile justice system—providing for the sentencing of juvenile offenders to secure youth treatment facilities only permits the application of precommitment custody credits against the maximum term of commitment, rather than the baseline.
The court also held that application of the law does not implicate equal protection concerns due to the differing treatment of minors before the enactment of the statute and after its effective date, finding that a legislative body is entitled to make changes to sentencing schemes without running afoul of the U.S. or California Constitutions.
Justice Gail Ruderman Feuer wrote the opinion—originally filed on May 15 and certified for publication. as modified. on Wednesday—affirming the disposition order of Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Nancy Newman. Presiding Justice Gonzalo C. Martinez and Justice John L. Segal joined in the opinion.
Appealing the application of credits was Jose R., who was charged in January 2022 in a juvenile petition with first-degree murder after a shooting in which the then-16 year old minor and an adult man fired multiple gunshots at the victim.
After the prosecution agreed to amend the petition to allege one count of assault with a semi-automatic firearm in violation of Penal Code §245(b), Jose R. admitted the new allegation and the murder charge was dismissed.
Section 875
Effective Jan. 1, 2023, Welfare and Institutions Code §875 provides in subsection (b) that the court must “set a baseline term of confinement” that “shall represent the time in custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to prepare the ward for discharge.” The baseline term may be modified downward during progress review hearings to be held every six months.
Subdivision (c)(1) of the section also provides that the court must “additionally set a maximum term of confinement for the ward based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter…and as deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation,” but the maximum term “shall not exceed the middle term of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense or offenses.”
Sec. 875(c)(1)(C), in turn, provides that “[p]recommitment credits for time served must be applied against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision.”
Prior to the disposition hearing, Jose R. requested that the court apply his precommitment custody credits to his baseline term according to caselaw interpreting juvenile sentencing statutes in existence before the enactment of §875. Newman denied the motion and applied 395 days of precommitment custody credits against the maximum term of confinement in the secure youth treatment facility.
Juvenile Realignment
Feuer noted that, in 2020 and 2021, the Legislature passed a series of laws—including what became §875— aimed at juvenile justice realignment, ensuring that juvenile offenders be housed closer to their families and receive age-appropriate care. Before that time, the most serious offenders were housed in state-run Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice centers.
The new statutory scheme transferred the responsibility of these minors to local governments and the youth are committed to county-run secure youth treatment facilities. The changes also amended the sentencing scheme.
Feuer pointed out that “[t]he Courts of Appeal were divided” on the question of how to apply precommitment custody credits before realignment.
Citing one of those cases, Jose R. argues that prior to realignment, courts were required to apply precommitment custody credits to the custodial term under now-repealed §731(b), which he contends is the functional equivalent of the baseline term that juvenile courts must impose post-realignment under §875(b)(1).
Comparison Unnecessary
Unpersuaded by the comparison, Feuer remarked that “[c]ontrary to Jose’s contention, we need not analogize the pre- and post-realignment statutes to determine how the Legislature intended precommitment custody credits to apply: the Legislature has explicitly instructed juvenile courts to apply custody credits to the ‘maximum term of confinement’ imposed under section 875, subdivision (c)(1).”
The jurist pointed out that where statutory language is clear, courts must follow its plain meaning, and opined:
“Section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C), unambiguously states that ‘[p]recommitment credits for time served must be applied against the maximum term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision.’…. Jose’s argument essentially asks us to rewrite subdivision (c)(1)(C) to substitute the words ‘baseline term’ for ‘maximum term.’ We cannot.”
She rejected Jose R.’s “attempt to manufacture an ambiguity” in §875, saying:
“Jose argues, the maximum term of confinement has inconsistent meanings—a term based on the facts and circumstances of the matter under section 875, subdivision (c)(1), and the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense, as set forth in section 875, subdivision (c)(2)…. There is no inconsistency—the maximum term of confinement must reflect the facts and circumstances of the matter, but cannot exceed the middle term for an adult offense.”
She continued:
“[E]ven if there were some ambiguity or inconsistency in section 875…it is not our role to rewrite the statute given the Legislature’s clear pronouncement in section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C), that precommitment custody credits must be applied against the maximum term of confinement.”
Equal Protection
Jose R. asserts that the application of precommitment custody credits to the maximum term of confinement pursuant to §875(c)(1)(C) violates the Equal Protection Clause by treating minors sentenced prior to realignment differently than those sentenced after the enactment of the new scheme.
Feuer acknowledged that “[b]oth the federal and California Constitutions guarantee individuals the equal protection of the laws,” but was not convinced that the constitutional protections are implicated in this case. She wrote:
“[A]s the Supreme Court has explained, the Legislature is entitled to make changes to sentencing statutes that create disparities between how individuals are sentenced before and after the amendments without violating principles of equal protection….Therefore, regardless of whether realignment resulted in less favorable treatment of precommitment credits (which is far from clear), the amendments did not violate equal protection principles.”
The case is In re Jose R., 2024 S.O.S. 1871.
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