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Court of Appeal:
Purported Acceptance of §998 Offer Was a Counteroffer
Yegan Says Judgment Is Void on Its Face Due to Language in Purported Acceptance Going Beyond Offer
By Kimber Cooley, Staff Writer
Div. Six of this district’s Court of Appeal held yesterday that a notice of acceptance by civil defendants of an offer to compromise which contained language releasing them—and any other persons—from all claims in the matter did not constitute an acceptance of the plaintiff’s settlement proposal and instead created a counteroffer.
The offer was made to only one of the two defendants—who are father and daughter—but the acceptance, containing the broad release, was signed by both. Over the plaintiff’s objection, judgment was entered based on the purported acceptance.
Justice Kenneth Yegan authored the unpublished opinion which vacates the order by Ventura Superior Court Judge Henry J. Walsh denying the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the judgment. Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert and Justice Tari L. Cody joined in the opinion.
On Aug. 15, 2021, Maya Endrawes filed a complaint for damages arising out of a car accident with defendant Briaunna Mitchell. Endrawes sued Mitchell and her father, Harold Mitchell, who owned the car.
The complaint also named Briaunna Mitchell’s mother, Tonia Mitchell, who was never served.
On June 3, 2022, Endrawes made an offer to compromise, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §998, to Briaunna Mitchell. The offer proposed to settle the lawsuit in exchange for $210,000.
The offer did not include language offering to settle the action against Harold or Tonia Mitchell.
Purported Acceptance
Two days before the expiration date on the offer, the Mitchells’ attorney signed a statement of acceptance on behalf of both defendants. A document was filed with the court saying that the payment will be “in satisfaction of all of Plaintiff’s claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, both known and unknown, arising out of, related to or in any way connected with interest in this action.”
The document adds:
“Whereby Plaintiff and her successors hereby release, acquit and forever discharge Defendant, Defendant’s successors, agents, assigns, officers, directors, representatives, and any and all other persons, firms and corporations whatsoever, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, both known and unknown, specifically including but not limited to, any and all claims in this matter and any related matter.”
Objections Filed
Endrawes filed objections to the notice of acceptance 11 days later asserting that the filing is a counteroffer and not an acceptance. Walsh ordered the parties to meet and to submit a stipulated judgment.
On Dec. 5, 2022, the parties informed the court that they had been unable to agree on how to proceed. A minute order was issued after the hearing ordering “each side to submit their (last and best proposal) form of judgment on or before December 16, 2022.”
Endrawes again protested, repeating her contention that the purported acceptance is void.
On Dec. 29, 2022, Walsh signed a “Judgment on Stipulation,” prepared by the defendants, which provides:
“Plaintiff and defendant agreed (stipulated) that a judgment be entered in this case. The court approved the stipulated judgment and the signed written stipulation was filed in the case.”
The judgment required Briaunna Mitchell to pay Endrawes $210,000.
Endrawes was served with notice of entry of judgment on April 7, 2023. She filed a motion to vacate the judgment 20 days later.
Walsh denied the motion, saying in part:
“CCP section 473(d) allows the court to set aside a void judgment. A judgment is ‘void’ when the court entering the judgment lacked jurisdiction to do so. That is not the case here. The judgment may have been voidable due to the form of defendant’s acceptance of the…offer to compromise, but the court had jurisdiction to enter it. As such, no relief is possible under CCP section 473.”
Void Judgment
Code of Civil Procedure §473(d) provides that “[t]he court…may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” Yegan noted that a judgment is considered void on its face when the invalidity is obvious from an inspection of the judgment role or court record, without having to consider other evidence.
The jurist noted that in order for an acceptance of an offer to form a binding settlement, it must be absolute and unqualified. Looking to the acceptance in question, he reasoned:
“Here, the judgment is void on its face because the judgment roll shows that respondent’s acceptance of appellant’s offer to compromise was not absolute and unqualified. The notice of acceptance prepared by respondent’s counsel included a condition that could be construed as releasing respondent’s parents from liability for the collision….Thus, respondent’s notice of acceptance constituted a counteroffer. Appellant’s offer expired 30 days after it was made on June 3, 2022.”
He continued:
“There is no reasonable basis for the denial of appellant’s motion to vacate the void judgment. Appellant acted promptly and diligently in objecting to the entry of judgment and in seeking to vacate the judgment. Appellant filed her motion to vacate the judgment 20 days after she had been served with notice of entry of the judgment. Respondent has not shown that she was prejudiced by the 20-day delay.”
The case is Endrawes v. Mitchell, B330916.Copyright 2024, Metropolitan News Company