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Court of Appeal:
Conviction That Became ‘Final’ in 2017 Is Now ‘Nonfinal’
Baltodano Says Senate Bill 1391 Applies to 2013 Murder Case Due to Conditional Reversal on Habeas Petition Rendering Conviction Nonfinal; Yegan Puts Forth Strong Dissent
By Kimber Cooley, Staff Writer
Div. Six of this district’s Court of Appeal held Friday that a judgment of conviction became nonfinal when a defendant, who was a minor at the time he committed a murder but was sentenced as an adult, had his sentence conditionally upset on a writ of habeas corpus, rendering him eligible for the benefit of ameliorative laws enacted after imposition of his sentence and after his case had been deemed final.
The decision comes in a case in which a 14-year-old was tried and sentenced as an adult for murdering a rival gang member in 2013 and had his sentence conditionally reversed eight years later, after the enactment of a new law prohibiting transferring 14-year-olds to adult criminal court.
Justice Hernaldo J. Baltodano wrote the opinion reversing an order by Ventura Superior Court Judge Ferdinand P. Inumerable. Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert joined in the opinion.
Justice Kenneth R. Yegan dissented, objecting that the majority’s ruling “equate[s] the ‘conditional reversal’ with a ‘true reversal’ ” which “results in a potential ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ card.”
Trial as Adult
The murder in question occurred in April 2009 when the minor, identified as A.M., saw the rival gang member, 16-year-old S.S., at a party. As the youngest member of the gang, A.M. believed that it was his duty to confront S.S., and later that night the two juveniles exchanged blows.
During the fight, A.M. stabbed S.S. multiple times before running away and calling his mother to ask her to pick him up from the side of the road. S.S. later died from his wounds.
The prosecutor charged A.M. as an adult and a jury convicted him of first-degree murder in violation of Penal Code §187(a) and found true an allegation that he committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang and a gang-murder special circumstance. He was sentenced to 26 years to life in state prison.
His judgment was affirmed on appeal and the California Supreme Court denied review. A.M. did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court and the matter became final on Jan. 10, 2017.
Newly Adopted Provisions
On Nov. 8, 2016, the electorate in California enacted Proposition 57, which took effect the following day. As adopted, the proposition prohibited trying a minor as an adult without a judicial determination that the minor was unfit to be dealt with under juvenile law.
It limited the transfer of minors to adult criminal courts and transfers would only be granted after a juvenile judge conducted a transfer hearing to consider factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history and likelihood of rehabilitation.
Following the passage of Proposition 57, the Legislature enacted several statutes to amend and implement its provisions. One bill that became law effective Jan. 1, 2019, is Senate Bill 1391, which bars a Juvenile Court from transferring a 14-year-old to adult criminal court regardless of the crime that was allegedly committed.
In 2021, A.M. asked the Court of Appeal to recall the remittitur in his underlying case, arguing that he was entitled to relief under Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391. The court declined to do so and instead elected to treat A.M.’s motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It issued an order to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to show cause, in the Superior Court, as to “why relief should not be granted on the ground that [A.M.] is entitled to a [transfer] hearing.”
Conditional Reversal
The Superior Court conditionally reversed A.M.’s conviction and sentence and referred the matter to the Juvenile Court for a transfer hearing. A.M. argued that Senate Bill 1391 deprived the court of authority to transfer his case to adult criminal court because he was only 14 at the time of the murder.
Inumerable declined to apply Senate Bill 1391, finding that the request exceeded the order to show cause and that A.M.’s case was “final” and “should be treated as a continuing write of habeas corpus for the sole purpose of conducting a transfer hearing.”
The prosecutor argued that the Juvenile Court should apply the law in effect on Jan. 10, 2017, the date the case became final on direct appeal. Inumerable agreed and granted the motion to transfer A.M.’s case to adult criminal court.
Padilla Case
Baltodano noted that the provisions of Senate Bill 1391 apply regardless of whether the minor’s case is before the Juvenile Court after the statute’s effective date or the case was not yet final on appeal when the bill took effect. The jurist expanded the application to the case at hand, saying that “we conclude that Senate Bill 1391 also applies where, as here, a case is before the juvenile court because the minor is granted relief on collateral review.”
He cited the 2022 California Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Padilla as providing guiding principles for the analysis of the retroactivity of the bill.
In an opinion by Justice Goodwin H. Liu, the high court held that a defendant, who was 16 years old at the time he murdered his mother, was entitled to retroactive application of Proposition 57’s provision for a transfer hearing in Juvenile Court after his sentence had been vacated pursuant to a U.S. Supreme Court decision clarifying the analysis that must precede a life-sentence for a juvenile defendant.
Liu said that when Padilla’s sentence was vacated on a habeas corpus petition, his case was rendered nonfinal, writing that “the trial court regained the jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was appropriate for him, and Padilla regained the right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed” and that appeal must be deemed “part of direct review of a nonfinal judgment, not collateral review of a final judgment.”
Retroactivity of Bill
Considering A.M.’s case, Baltodano said:
“Applying those principles here entitles A.M. to the ameliorative benefit of Senate Bill 1391’s provisions. Because A.M.’s judgment was not final on November 9, 2016, Prop. 57 retroactively applies to his case….The superior court was therefore required to conditionally reverse his conviction and sentence on habeas corpus….It did so and referred his case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing. Once that occurred, A.M.’s case became nonfinal….”
He rejected the prosecution’s attempt to distinguish Padilla, writing:
“[The Attorney General] claims that unlike Padilla, no court has vacated A.M.’s pre-Prop. 57 conviction or sentence. The Attorney General is mistaken: In response to our order to show cause, the superior court conditionally reversed A.M.’s conviction and sentence.”
Baltodano continued:
“The Attorney General also argues that unlike the vacatur in Padilla, the conditional reversal here did not disturb A.M.’s conviction or sentence so as to render his case nonfinal. But Padilla itself involved a conditional reversal….So have cases retroactively applying Senate Bill 1391….It is with a conditional affirmance, not a conditional reversal, that a judgment remains in place pending further proceedings.”
The justice also found unpersuasive the assertion that applying the provisions of the bill would exceed the scope of the order to show cause and said “while our order to show cause did not refer to Senate Bill 1391’s age limitations, applying it here is consistent with the purpose of those hearings: to determine whether juvenile defendants like A.M. may be transferred to criminal court.”
Yegan’s View
Yegan made two “observations” before proceeding with any legal analysis, noting that “this is a serious gang related stabbing where the victim is dead” and that A.M. “has been in prison for fifteen years” and “will be released on parole if and when the Board thinks he is ready for release.”
Saying that parole “should be his only potential remedy,” the jurist opined:
“A ‘conditional reversal’ is, obviously, not a reversal else the word, ‘conditional’ would not be included in the superior court’s order. Let us use a modicum of common sense: The superior court, by ordering a transfer hearing, was only looking for a way to allow the juvenile court to consider the merits of keeping appellant in the juvenile system. It did not reverse the conviction. It did not vacate the sentence. And it did not believe that it was rendering the earlier judgment ‘not final.’ We should not stretch the Padilla holding beyond its express limits.”
He continued:
“But, the majority opinion, essentially, erases the word, ‘conditional’ and thus, appellant gets the benefit of the ameliorative law which, in reality, vacates the jury verdict and the judgment of 15 years ago because even though it was final for fifteen years, it is not now ‘final.’ I see no principled way to agree with this analysis.”
The case is In re A.M., 2024 S.O.S. 1751.
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