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Court of Appeal:
Counsel Withdrawal Midway Through Trial Not Prejudicial
Hoffstadt Says Judge Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Denying Continuance to Find Substitute Attorney,
Thus Forcing Plaintiff to Represent Himself Before Jury for the Remainder of the Case
By Kimber Cooley, Associate Editor
Div. Two of this district’s Court of Appeal has held that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting the withdrawal of counsel in the middle of a civil jury trial—and in denying the plaintiff’s request for a continuance to find a new lawyer—where the deterioration of the attorney-client relationship had been on display in court for weeks before the motion and plaintiff had represented herself previously in the matter.
The rancorous relationship arose in an action brought in 2016 by Teresija Sigmund against the Darlington Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. and certain of its members. Her causes of action, based on allegations of improper maintenance of her Brentwood condominium and fraudulent management of funds, including claims of breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.
The suit was filed after the association began foreclosure proceedings against Sigmund in 2016 relating to her failure to pay $58,196.50 in dues.
Steven L. Rodriguez—who was disbarred in January 2023 for mismanagement of client funds unrelated to Sigmund’s case—was substituted in as counsel in May 2021 as the third lawyer for the plaintiff. Sigmund represented herself during the stretches between attorneys, during which periods she handled depositions, filed motions, and filed pleadings.
Motion to Withdraw
Following opening statements and testimony by Sigmund and another witness in February 2022, Rodriguez made an oral motion seeking to be relieved as counsel. Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Rafael A. Ongkeko found good cause to allow his withdrawal and denied requests for a continuance by Sigmund in the days that followed.
The jury returned a special verdict on Feb. 28, 2022, finding that the association had breached a fiduciary duty to Sigmund but that the violation did not cause any damages. The jury found that she had not carried her burden as to the remaining claims.
Following the verdict, she moved for a new trial based on the court’s grant of Rodriguez’s motion to withdraw without a continuance. Ongkeko denied the motion and ordered entry of judgment on the verdict on Aug. 5, 2022.
Justice Brian M. Hoffstadt authored the unpublished opinion, filed Thursday, affirming the judgment. Acting Presiding Justice Judith Ashmann-Gerst and Justice Victoria M. Chavez joined in the opinion.
Hoffstadt noted that “[a] withdrawal lacking good cause constitutes abandonment of the client” and the court must assess if granting the motion would result in prejudice to the client. Similarly, a mid-trial continuance must be based on good cause and a balance of facts and circumstances must weigh in favor of the delay.
He pointed out that good cause “to permit a withdrawal of counsel exists when there has been a breakdown in the relationship between attorney and client.” Turning to the soured relationship in the present case, he reasoned:
“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding ‘good cause’ to allow Rodriguez to withdraw as counsel or in implicitly finding ‘good cause’ to grant a continuance. With respect to the withdrawal of counsel, Rodriguez represented that his relationship with plaintiff had become so toxic that he feared plaintiff would falsely accuse him of the crime of assault and battery. This representation alone is sufficient to establish the breakdown of their relationship….Further, the court observed Rodriguez and plaintiff ‘go at it’ in court, which further corroborates Rodriguez’s representation.”
Turning to the continuance, he explained that California Rule of Court rule 3.1332(c)(3) provides that good cause for delay exists due to “[t]he unavailability of counsel because of….excusable circumstances.” He concluded that “the trial court’s grant of the withdrawal motion left plaintiff’s attorney ‘unavailab[le]’ due to ‘excusable circumstances’; this constituted ‘good cause’ for a continuance.”
Fairness to Client
Looking to the facts of the case, he opined:
“The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in balancing the pertinent circumstances in coming to the conclusion that plaintiff would not be denied a fair trial if required to proceed without representation and without a continuance. Implicit in the general maxim that forcing a client to trial without counsel is ‘not likely to ensure fairness’ is that this scenario does not inevitably lead to unfairness. Here, the trial court had sufficient basis for concluding it would not in this case. Given the ever spiraling rancor between plaintiff and Rodriguez on display in the weeks leading up to Rodriguez’s motion, plaintiff had ‘sufficient advance warning’ that her relationship with Rodriguez was headed toward a breakdown.”
He continued:
“Although plaintiff maintained that she did not want to represent herself, she consistently insisted that she wanted to share the reins of representation as ‘co-counsel’—both with Rodriguez and with her potential new counsel; given plaintiff’s demonstrated ability to represent herself in the interregnum periods between her prior counsels’ representations as well as her insistence during the trial for Rodriguez to elicit certain evidence, the trial court had an ample basis for concluding that requiring plaintiff to proceed without a longer continuance would not deny her a fair trial.”
The jurist acknowledged that the timing of the withdrawal was extraordinary, saying that “this issue arose in the middle of trial when a jury had been empaneled.” However, he reasoned:
“Continuing the trial…would have necessarily resulted in a mistrial, a result plaintiff indicated she did not want. At no point did the trial court articulate that it was adhering to a blanket rule against continuances; because the court considered and weighed a variety of factors—articulated most ably in its new trial motion—the court did not abuse its discretion.”
Hoffstadt was unpersuaded by Sigmund’s assertion that Rodriguez had exaggerated the rancor between them. He said:
“By and large, these arguments ask us to reweigh the evidence and reassess credibility, when our task is simply to ask whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings underlying its discretionary decision….[T]he evidence…amply supports the trial court’s finding of a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, and there is nothing inconsistent with a relationship that was contentious but functional and then crossed a line into one that is dysfunctional and toxic.”
He concluded that “[e]ven if the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Rodriguez to withdraw as counsel without granting plaintiff a continuance, that error did not prejudice plaintiff.” The jurist remarked:
“Plaintiff has not carried her burden of showing that having Rodriguez or any other counsel represent her for the remainder of the second phase of trial was reasonably likely to have altered the outcome….Plaintiff subpoenaed witnesses, conducted (both direct and cross-) examinations of witnesses, argued evidentiary issues, defended against motions, and made a closing argument. Although the jury did not award her any damages, plaintiff prevailed on her breach of fiduciary duty claim against the Association.”
The court also found her assertion of misconduct by the defendants’ counsel during trial to be without merit.
The case is Sigmund v. Darlington Villas Homeowners Association, Inc., B324761.
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