Page 1
Ninth Circuit:
Perceptible Ankle Monitor Is Not Inherently Prejudicial
By Kimber Cooley, Staff Writer
|
|
|
—AP An ankle monitor is depicted. The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held yesterday that criminal defendants who are required to wear them are not necessarily prejudiced if jurors spot them. |
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held yesterday that the fact that at least one juror likely noticed an ankle monitor worn by a criminal defendant before trial—due to a beeping sound coming from the monitor during jury selection and defense counsel fiddling with the device in trying to quiet it—was not inherently prejudicial and did not warrant a new trial where actual prejudice was not established.
Circuit Judge John B. Owens wrote the opinion affirming the judgment of conviction of the defendant by Senior District Court Judge John A. Kronstadt of the Central District of California of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Circuit Judge Patrick Bumatay joined in the opinion.
Circuit Judge Salvador Mendoza Jr. wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing with the result but disagreeing with the majority’s reasoning.
Audible Alerts
Appealing the conviction was Chanel Wiley who had been ordered to wear an electronic ankle monitor during the pendency of her criminal action after being arrested for a second time while awaiting trial.
On the first day of her jury trial, shortly before jury selection began, defense counsel informed Kronstadt that the ankle monitor “keeps giving out audible alerts, and we’re afraid that would be prejudicial to the jury.” Efforts were made to mute the device, but the beeping continued during the voir dire.
Kronstadt acknowledged the sound but indicated that he did not believe that the jurors knew what was causing the alert. The monitor was removed from Wiley’s ankle during the next break, outside of the presence of the prospective jurors.
The jury convicted Wiley of conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. §846 and Kronstadt sentenced her to 16 months in state prison, a sentence that fell below the sentencing guidelines.
Juror Awareness
Disagreeing with Kronstadt that the jury was unaware of the device, Owens said:
“As a threshold matter, we assume that at least one juror concluded that the beeping sound meant that Wiley was wearing an ankle monitor. The district judge acknowledged hearing the noise and did not dispute that the jurors also could hear it.”
He continued:
“Indeed, during the period when Wiley was wearing the beeping ankle monitor, more than one juror reported difficulty hearing the judge….Once the monitor was removed, the jurors’ complaints that they were having difficulty hearing ceased. Finally, defense counsel ‘fiddle[d]’ with the ankle monitor in view of the jurors. This evidence indicates that the jurors heard the beeping noise and knew it was coming from Wiley’s ankle monitor.”
Two Cases
Owens pointed to two U.S. Supreme Court cases as offering guiding principles for the court’s analysis.
In the 1986 decision in Holbrook v. Flynn, authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall (now deceased), the high court established a framework for determining the level of prejudice resulting from a juror’s observation of a defendant under government restraint.
Marshall declared that courts must first determine whether what the jurors saw was so “inherently prejudicial” as to pose “an unacceptable threat to defendant’s right to a fair trial” in which case the conviction must be overturned. If the security measures are not inherently prejudicial, the defendant must show actual prejudice, he said.
In the 2005 decision in Deck v. Missouri, the Supreme Court considered the use of shackles and held, in an opinion by then-Justice Stephen Breyer (now retired), that “the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury” absent an essential state interest in such restraints, such as courtroom security.
Examining both cases, Owens declared:
“While we are mindful of Deck…we conclude that the shackles in Deck and the ankle monitor in this case are two very different things, and ankle monitors are not entitled to Deck’s presumption of prejudice. Nor are ankle monitors inherently prejudicial under Holbrook.”
Owens noted that the Deck decision was “rooted” in the English common law prohibition on the use of painful chain shackles during trial and “extended the common law rule to less painful” modern restraints because such devices undermine the presumption of innocence, can diminish the right to counsel by interfering with the ability to communicate, and undermine the dignity of the proceedings.
Citing definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary, the jurist distinguished an ankle monitor from shackles, saying:
“[A]n ankle monitor is not a ‘shackle’ or ‘bond’ in the literal sense. It does not physically bind an individual’s ‘body or limbs’ or tie her to ‘the floor or wall.’ ”
He continued:
“But, even if an ankle monitor falls within the figurative definition of shackle or bond, extending the prohibition on visible shackling to ankle monitors would not accord with the original basis for the common law rule; Wiley has not alleged, nor is there any evidence to suggest, that an ankle monitor causes pain or interferes with a defendant’s ability to represent herself.”
Owens was not persuaded that perceptible ankle monitors undermine the presumption of innocence in the same way shackles do, as shackles tend to suggest that a defendant is dangerous and an ankle monitor only suggests that the defendant poses a flight risk.
Similarly, he reasoned, ankle monitors “are not so painful or cumbersome as to discourage a defendant” from cooperating in his or her own defense and do not interfere with the ability to communicate with counsel.
Owens commented that ankle monitors are also “must less conspicuous and disruptive” than the examples the Supreme Court has determined “threaten the courtroom’s formal dignity.”
No Inherent Prejudice
Having found that ankle monitors do not pose the same concerns as shackles, Owens applied the Holbrook analysis for inherent prejudice, remarking:
“Holbrook and its progeny establish that jurors understand that some security measures are required at courthouses, so such measures are not inherently prejudicial unless they impermissibly suggest guilt. An ankle monitor easily satisfies this test for reasons similar to why an ankle monitor is not a shackle.”
He continued:
“Indeed, as this case proves, an ankle monitor—which permitted Wiley to enter the courthouse through the same security as the jurors, ride the same elevators, and enter the courtroom through the same door as the jurors—makes clear that the defendant is not a dangerous person.”
Owens acknowledged that “there appears to be little case law on this issue,” but wrote that “we conclude that ankle monitors are not inherently prejudicial….”
The jurist rejected Wiley’s argument that the ankle monitor caused actual prejudice, finding that Kronstadt’s “thoughtful approach to handling the issue of the beeping ankle monitor” was appropriate and noting that the defendant did not object to the resolution of the issue nor ask to voir dire the jurors.
Mendoza’s View
Mendoza concurred in the judgment but took issue with the majority’s assumption that a juror perceived the ankle monitor, saying that the assumption was not supported by the record and “[t]hat glaring hole in the record forecloses Wiley’s due process argument and should have ended our analysis.”
He wrote:
“Rather than adjudicate the case on the record before us, [the majority] assumes a material fact….It proceeds to announce not one but two rules of constitutional law. I disagree with the majority’s decision to assume such a critical fact in an effort to reach a due process issue. But the majority makes matters worse in its handling of that due process issue. It concludes that an ankle monitor is not a ‘shackle’ within the meaning of Deck v. Missouri…and that it is not an inherently prejudicial trial practice.”
He continued:
“Although I generally agree that an ankle monitor is not quite a ‘shackle,’ I conclude that a perceptible ankle monitor is inherently prejudicial. After all, an ankle monitor is a distinctive and stigmatizing device that brands the defendant as an especially dangerous or culpable person. Because of that, it undermines the presumption of innocence and erodes the fairness of the fact-finding process.”
The case is United States v. Wiley, 22-50235.
Copyright 2024, Metropolitan News Company