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S.C. Reverses High-Term Sentence Based on Several Unproven Aggravating Factors
Corrigan Says Amendment Mandates Remand Unless Jury Would Have Found All Exacerbating Facts True; Guerrero Dissents
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The California Supreme Court held yesterday that an amendment to a sentencing statute—prohibiting the imposition of a maximum sentence unless aggravating factors other than prior convictions are proven beyond a reasonable doubt—requires the reversal of upper-term sentences unless a jury would have found true each of the aggravated factors or those facts were otherwise proven in compliance with the current law.
The dispute arose in a case against Deandre Lynch, who was convicted following a jury trial of three counts of domestic violence against the mother of his child, Jasmine Doe, based on abuse occurring in early 2020. Then-Sacramento Superior Court Judge Geoffrey Goodman (now retired) sentenced Lynch to 15 years and four months in prison in April 2021, imposing an upper term based on eight aggravating factors.
On Jan. 1, 2022, Penal Code §1170(b) was amended to require that any aggravating circumstances justifying an upper-term sentence, other than prior convictions, be “stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
Lynch appealed based on the amendment. The Third District Court of Appeal held that reversal was not required because two of the aggravating circumstances—Lynch’s use of a weapon and his prior convictions—were proven in compliance with the revised law.
Justice Carol Corrigan wrote the opinion for the divided high court, reversing and remanding for “further litigation of the aggravating circumstances.” Justices Goodwin H. Liu, Joshua P. Groban and Kelli Evans joined in the opinion.
Justice Leondra Kruger, joined by Justice Martin J. Jenkins, dissented in part but concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero dissented.
Divided Appellate Courts
Corrigan wrote:
“The Courts of Appeal have uniformly concluded that the 2022 statutory amendment applies retroactively. They have also uniformly concluded that defendants sentenced under the old law are not automatically entitled to a remand, and that some type of prejudice inquiry applies. The courts have reached different conclusions about the extent to which the current statute implicates the Sixth Amendment, and how precisely to articulate the prejudice inquiry in this context. We granted review to answer these questions.”
She continued:
“We hold that under the current statute a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established. The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine…the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.”
No Automatic Remand
Corrigan noted that there is no dispute that the amendment applies retroactively to Lynch’s sentence but rejected Lynch’s assertion that he is entitled to automatic remand and said that “[b]ecause omission of the jury trial right with regard to elements of an offense or enhancement is not automatically grounds for reversal, the same analysis applies when assessing the omission involved here.”
She turned to the question of what test is appropriate for assessing prejudice. A less-stringent test applies to errors of state law than to violations of the U.S. Constitution. Under the stricter standard set forth in the 1987 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Chapman v. California, reversal is required in the event of a violation of federal constitutional rights unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
She remarked:
“The plain language of section 1170(b)’s current version now requires that, excepting prior convictions and in the absence of a waiver or stipulation, aggravating facts relied upon to justify an upper term must be resolved by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. What we must decide is the extent to which this right is tethered to the Sixth Amendment or is simply a state law entitlement. Resolution of that question dictates the appropriate standard of review. Although the question has constitutional implications, it is primarily one of statutory interpretation and legislative intent.”
Sixth Amendment Triggered
Corrigan looked to the updated statute and said:
“Under the current statute the middle term is the maximum term that can be imposed unless additional factual determinations are made. It is the requirement of additional factfinding that brings the Sixth Amendment into play….By referring to aggravating circumstances ‘that justify the imposition of’ an upper term sentence…, the statute contemplates all of the aggravating circumstances that the court actually relies on to justify the sentence, not some subset of those circumstances.”
She added that “under the current statute the aggravating facts used to ‘justify’ an upper term sentence are ‘necessary to [its] imposition,’…and effectively function like elements of a crime.”
The justice concluded:
“When the trial court actually relies on improperly proven aggravating facts to ‘justify’ an upper term sentence, a Sixth Amendment violation occurs and Chapman must be satisfied. That is to say the reviewing court must be able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the unproven aggravating facts to be true had it been properly instructed. This prejudice inquiry does not allow us to uphold the trial court’s imposition of an upper term sentence based on some subset of aggravating facts.”
She declared that “[b]ecause we cannot find the omission of a jury trial harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact relied upon by the trial court to impose an upper term, Lynch’s sentence must be reversed” and “[f]urther proceedings on remand are to be conducted in accordance with the current statutory requirements and the defendant given the opportunity for the jury trial, of which he was deprived.”
Guerrero’s View
Guerrero wrote:
The majority concludes that, under California’s current determinate sentencing law…each of the aggravating facts found by the trial court was ‘necessary’ to the imposition of the upper term sentence on Lynch, and each is therefore covered by the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial….I respectfully disagree.”
She continued:
“Under the current [law], as the majority confirms, ‘[o]nly a single aggravating factor is required to impose the upper term.’….Nothing in the current [law] requires the existence of multiple aggravating facts in order to impose an upper term of imprisonment. Even if one (or more) of the aggravating facts here had not been proven, the trial court would still have been able to legally impose the upper term on Lynch based on the remaining aggravating facts. This circumstance distinguishes aggravating facts in this context from the elements of a criminal offense, each of which is essential. The majority errs by conflating the two.”
Pointing out the Lynch concedes that one aggravating factor—his prior convictions—was proven in accordance with the Sixth Amendment and the current law, she concluded:
“In my view…Lynch’s concession that one aggravating fact was proved in accordance with the Sixth Amendment forecloses any claim of error under the federal Constitution. Because Lynch has not shown any federal constitutional error, there is no need to consider harmlessness under Chapman.”
Kruger’s View
Kruger disagreed that the amended statute implicates Sixth Amendment rights to the extent the majority opinion declares. She wrote:
“Although I agree with much of what the majority says on this subject, the majority goes too far in holding that a violation of the new statutory right to a jury finding on each and every aggravating fact is also, perforce, a violation of the federal Constitution. That conclusion is contrary to this court’s precedent addressing effectively the identical constitutional issue.”
She continued:
“I nonetheless concur in the judgment because, as I see it, the majority’s constitutional reasoning is not necessary to its conclusion. In the end, what matters is that Lynch had a right to a jury trial on all aggravating facts. Whatever the source of the right, I do not think we can say that the deprivation of the right was harmless.”
The case is People v. Lynch, 2024 S.O.S. 2576.
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