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C.A. Axes Order Requiring CHP to Consider Ability to Pay
Opinion Says Injunction, Inspired by Dueñas, Requiring Agency to Consider Party’s Financial Condition Before Imposing Fees Relating to Impounded Vehicles Misconstrues Due Process Principles, Contravenes Statute
By a MetNews Staff Writer
Div. Two of this district’s Court of Appeal has reversed an order granting a permanent injunction requiring the California Highway Patrol to consider a vehicle owner’s present ability to pay towing and storage fees during impound hearings and vehicle release procedures, finding that relief was granted based on a misapplication of due process principles and requires the agency to contravene existing law.
The court also held that a second requirement that the agency revise its notice form, known as “CHP 180,” to advise owners of specific measures for retrieving impounded vehicles exceeds the requirements of due process as the Constitution does not mandate “individualized notice of the procedures for seeking return of seized property.”
Seeking the injunction was California taxpayer Robert Mann, who filed a complaint against the state and then-CHP Commissioner Warren Stanley under Code of Civil Procedure 526a, which allows taxpayers to challenge state actions that purportedly constitute illegal or wasteful expenditures of public funds. Mann does not allege any individualized harm but rather challenges CHP’s impound procedures on constitutional grounds.
Alleging that CHP illegally expends public funds by “routinely seiz[ing] vehicles without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, and without judicial review of any type,” Mann asserts Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations in the pleading.
The complaint does not mention or request ability-to-pay hearings.
Interpretation of Complaint
In overruling a demurrer filed by the defendants, then-Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Michael P. Linfield (now back in law practice) interpreted the complaint to include a due process claim based on the failure of the agency to consider the vehicle owner’s ability to pay for fines and fees required to obtain the release of the impounded vehicle.
In the order, Linfield quoted from the 2019 Court of Appeal opinion from this district’s Div. Seven in People v. Dueñas, saying:
“Although not argued by the parties, the Court points out that if fees provided for in statutes are ‘imposed without a determination that the defendant is able to pay, [they] are…fundamentally unfair; imposing these [fees] upon indigent defendants without a determination that they have the present ability to pay violates due process under both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution.’...Here, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that this policy denies due process because it requires individuals to pay a fee of $1,500 to $2,000 just for impounding the vehicle and if you are unable to pay the fee, it will result in a de facto vehicle forfeiture.”
Following a bench trial, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Maurice A. Leiter ordered the permanent injunction requiring that “CHP officers consider the present ability to pay towing, storage, and any other fees in vehicle storage hearings…and in vehicle returns.”
Justice Victoria M. Chavez authored the opinion, filed on Oct. 30 and certified for publication Wednesday, reversing the judgment. Presiding Justice Elwood Lui and Justice Judith Ashmann-Gerst joined in the opinion.
Dueñas Case
The Dueñas case involved a constitutional challenge to the imposition of court fees in criminal cases. In a controversial opinion written by then-Acting Presiding Justice Laurie Zelon (now retired), Div. Seven held that due process requires an ability-to-pay hearing before such costs are imposed on a defendant.
Chavez remarked that “we have previously disagreed with Dueñas’s analysis and have concluded it was wrongly decided,” citing the 2019 case of People v. Hicks, in which the California Supreme Court has granted review. She said:
“We do not agree with the position that due process demands a finding of an ability to pay prior to the imposition of fines or fees….Rather a violation of due process is shown when the imposition of fines or fees will result in the denial of the party’s access to the courts or result in the party’s incarceration….Since this case concerns vehicle impounds, not access to court or incarceration, the due process argument fails.”
Acknowledging the unsettled nature of the rule announced in Dueñas, she opined that “[e]ven if the due process argument did not fail on this ground, the principles in Dueñas do not apply to the statutory scheme for impounding vehicles for several other reasons.”
Civil Fees
The jurist distinguished the case, saying:
“The Dueñas court was primarily concerned with the punitive nature of…criminal fines and fees when imposed on indigent defendants. The court noted these financial obligations could lead to ‘cascading consequences’ for defendants who cannot pay, potentially including further incarceration and prolonged involvement with the criminal justice system.
“Vehicle impound fees, however, do not implicate these concerns. They do not extend a person’s involvement with the criminal justice system, nor do they result in additional criminal penalties for nonpayment. While failure to pay impound fees may result in the loss of the vehicle through a lien sale, this is a civil consequence directly related to the services provided, not a criminal punishment.”
She continued:
“The statutory scheme governing vehicle impounds already includes due process protections that were absent in the Dueñas context. Vehicle owners are entitled to prompt notice and a hearing to contest the validity of the impound….These existing procedures satisfy due process requirements without the need for additional ability-to-pay hearings.”
Statutory Intent
Chavez reasoned that “[t]he trial court’s requirement that CHP conduct ability-to-pay hearings and potentially waive towing and storage fees directly contravenes the express language and intent of Vehicle Code section 14602.6, subdivision (i)” which provides that “the registered owner…shall remain responsible for any towing and storage charges related to…impoundment.”
The justice wrote:
“Vehicle Code section 14602.6 has not been declared unconstitutional by any appellate court. In the absence of such a finding, lower courts are bound to apply the law as written. In its injunction, the trial court required CHP to consider waiving towing and storage charges based on ability to pay. In so doing, the trial court rewrote section 14602.6 to create an exception for indigent vehicle owners.”
She continued:
“Article III, section 3.5 of the California Constitution prohibits administrative agencies, including CHP, from refusing to enforce a statute on the grounds of unconstitutionality unless an appellate court has made such a determination. By requiring CHP to potentially waive fees that Vehicle Code section 14602.6 mandates vehicle owners pay, the trial court has placed CHP in the untenable position of potentially violating this constitutional provision. This requirement is particularly problematic given that Vehicle Code section 14602.6 has withstood previous constitutional scrutiny.”
The case is Mann v. State of California, B328374.
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