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California Supreme Court:
Doped-Up Defendant Waived Right to Presence at Trial
However, Justices Reject C.A.’s View That Voluntary Ingestion of Intoxicating Substances Is Per Se a Forfeiture
Of Right to Attendance at Criminal Proceeding; Two Dissenters Say Judge Should Have Granted Continuance
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The California Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, yesterday upheld the Court of Appeal’s affirmance of a attempted first-degree burglary conviction secured at a trial that, on what was both the second and final day, proceeded in the absence of the defendant who had voluntarily ingested illicit drugs and opted to go to the hospital rather than acceding to the judge’s telephonic order to come to court.
However, it rejected a premise expressed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s majority in its March 5, 2020 opinion, saying:
“To the extent the trial court’s ruling or the Court of Appeal’s decision suggests that a defendant who ingests illicit drugs and subsequently seeks medical attention is voluntarily absent as a matter of law, we disagree with this proposition.”
Individual Circumstances
Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye wrote for the majority. She declared that the individual circumstances must be considered and that, in the present case, the judge “did consider all of the information available and made a factual finding that, notwithstanding the effects of his drug use, defendant could have come to court and voluntarily chose not to do so” and substantial evidence supports the decision to proceed in the defendant’s absence.
Justices Goodwin H. Liu and Leondra Kruger each penned a dissent, expressing the view that Tuolumne Superior Court Judge James A. Boscoe should have ordered a continuance, as sought by the attorney for defendant Marcos Antonio Ramirez.
At issue was whether Penal Code §1043(b)(2) applies. It says that a non-capital felony trial that has started may continue where “the defendant is voluntarily absent.”
Boscoe said of the defendant on July 6, 2017:
“His voluntary use—intentional use of controlled substances is a voluntary act which caused this circumstance. And I consider that an intentional act which caused him to be absent from the court. I think he waived his right to be present at his trial based on these circumstances, and we will proceed with the trial.”
Detjen’s Opinion
Writing for the Court of Appeal’s majority, Justice Jennifer R.S. Detjen said:
“Defendant presented no good reason for his actions. There was no evidence he was unable to control the timing or amount of his drug ingestion. Although the trial court’s initial determination defendant was voluntarily absent was not conclusive…, that court had no sua sponte duty to reconsider its ruling once defendant appeared the next day.”
By then, the matter had gone to the jury.
Acting Presiding Justice Charles Poochigian signed Detjen’s opinion and Justice M. Bruce Smith wrote a dissent. Smith said:
“I would reverse the judgment in this matter for multiple reasons. First, the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the applicable law in finding that, in overdosing on dings on one occasion during the entire pendency of the case, Ramirez was voluntarily absent from trial. Second, without a hearing, the record was insufficient for the trial court to find that Ramirez’s ingestion of drugs reasonably supported an inference that he intended to waive his fundamental constitutional right to be present at his trial. Third, the trial court’s summary rejection of the defense request for an overnight continuance—when the purpose of the request was to permit Ramirez to exercise his constitutional rights to be present at his trial and to testify before the jury—was an abuse of discretion. Finally, the trial court’s erroneous denial of Ramirez’s constitutional rights—rights that are the foundation of our adversarial system—was prejudicial under any standard of prejudice.”
Denial of Continuance
In her opinion affirming the Court of Appeal’s decision, Cantil-Sakauye did not address the matter that was of concern to Liu and Kruger—Boscoe’s decision not to continue the matter for a day—except to say, in a footnote:
“Defendant’s petition for review did not adequately raise the additional question of whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defense counsel’s motion for a continuance….Even if the secondary issue were adequately raised, we are not compelled to address it and decline to do so here….”
Accordingly, she also did not discuss a point set forth in Detjen’s opinion: that even if it was error not to order a continuance, that error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of Ramirez’s admissions to police and a video of him captured by security cameras in the act of attempting a burglary.
“As a general proposition,” Cantil-Sakauye wrote, “we agree with defendant that a defendant who ingests illicit drugs and subsequently requires medical assistance after trial has commenced has not, invariably, voluntarily absented himself or herself.”
She said that Boscoe “did at times place heavy reliance on defendant’s drug use,” but nonetheless did consider the individual circumstances including his initially refusing medical attention and deciding to go to the hospital only after he was ordered to be in court in 15 minutes and, after leaving the hospital, going home instead of coming to court.
Cantil-Sakauye said:
“[T]he record does not support defendant’s characterization of the trial court’s finding as resting on an asserted rule that an absence stemming from drug use is per se voluntary. Indeed if this were so, the court’s inquiries to and colloquies with counsel, its unsuccessful advisement to defendant that he be in court in 15 minutes, and its later spontaneous willingness to recess for nearly three hours after the prosecution rested its case would likely not have occurred. Rather, the record as a whole reflects that the trial court tried to ascertain whether defendant was absent voluntarily.”
Liu’s Dissent
Liu said in his dissent:
“I agree with today’s opinion that the trial court should not have found that Ramirez’s voluntary drug use necessarily rendered him voluntarily absent from trial. But I cannot agree that the sparse record before us contains sufficient evidence by which the trial court could have found it clearly established that Ramirez voluntarily absented himself from trial under the correct standard. Nor can I agree that Ramirez has forfeited his challenge to the denial of his motion for a one-day continuance. Ramirez raised that argument in the trial court, in the Court of Appeal, and in his petition and briefing before us, and the Attorney General has never disputed that Ramirez properly preserved the issue for our review. Because the trial court erred by finding Ramirez’s absence voluntary and by denying the continuance request, and because holding trial in Ramirez’s absence was prejudicial, I would reverse the judgment.”
Kruger wrote separately to say she agrees with Liu.
The case is People v. Ramirez, 2022 S.O.S. 5890.
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