Page 1
Reference to Defendant Being on Parole Did Not Require Declaring a Mistrial—C.A.
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Court of Appeal for this district has held that a Los Angeles Superior Court judge did not err in denying a motion for a mistrial after two police officers let slip that the defendant was on parole, reasoning that a curative instruction nullified the damage and, in any event, the accused, by testifying, opened the door to use of prior convictions for the purpose of impeachment.
In Wednesday’s unpublished opinion affirming the conviction of Todd Johnson for assault with a deadly weapon, Justice Maria E. Stratton of Div. Eight told of how Judge Kathryn A. Solorzano had “promptly and forcefully” admonished the jury as to its need to disregard any reference to parole and her individually questioning jurors and alternates.
Explaining why there was no need to declare a mistrial, Stratton wrote:
“Given the brevity of the two references and the court’s extensive exploration of the issue with the jury, we find the trial court’s admonitions to the jury to disregard references to his parole status to be sufficient to cure any prejudice from the two statements….We presume a jury follows the court’s admonishments.”
Made Matters Worse
Johnson argued that the curative instructions had the effect of intensifying attention to the fact that he was on parole. Stratton disagreed, saying:
“[N]ot only was the prosecution’s case well underway at the time of the improper references to parole status, nothing in the record provides any reason to question the court’s belief that any prejudice resulting from the improper evidence was cured by its prompt and explicit directives that the jury disregard it.”
There was no abuse of discretion by Solorzano in denying a new trial, the justice said, pointing out:
“[B]y the end of the trial, appellant had chosen to testify on his own behalf and he was impeached both by his prior convictions and on the substance of his testimony. The two brief references to parole, both of which the jury was told in no uncertain terms to disregard, were certainly no more prejudicial than the evidence he previously had been convicted of robbery with a firearm, unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, and inflicting injury on a spouse or cohabitant, and two sanitized felonies involving moral turpitude.”
‘More Damning’
She continued:
“Appellant pronounces the two references to parole as ‘more damning’ than his actual priors because the jury was instructed the prior convictions could only be considered for impeachment; but by that reasoning, the fact that appellant was on parole would have no impact on deliberations because the jury was instructed that the parole references could not be considered for any purpose.”
The case is People v. Johnson, B308501.
Copyright 2022, Metropolitan News Company