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Ninth Circuit:
Board Is Obliged to Grant Compensation to Former Inmate Based on Federal Finding
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Court of Appeal for this district declared yesterday that the California Victim Compensation Board may not decide for itself whether a man who was freed on a writ of habeas corpus issued by the U.S. District Court—after making a finding of probable “actual innocence”—was “factually innocent,” as defined by California law, and that the board must grant monetary recompense without holding a hearing.
Justice Lamar Baker of this district’s Div. Five authored the opinion. It reverses a judgment by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge James C. Chalfant adverse to the contention of Daniel Larsen, who spent 13 years in prison following a 1999 a jury conviction for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger.
Baker’s conclusion clashes with that of this district’s Div. Four expressed in its Feb. 19 opinion in Souliotes v. California Victim Compensation Board.
Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in Schlup v. Delo, a District Court is authorized to decide on the merits an otherwise procedurally barred petition for habeas relief upon new evidence of innocence where it is first found that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” The issue before Div. Five was whether the finding required of a District Court in considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus—probability of “actual innocence”—is tantamount to a finding of “factual innocence” which, under Penal Code §1485.55(a), would be binding on the board.
Baker’s Opinion
Baker said:
“As Schlup and subsequent cases repeatedly emphasize, it is ‘extremely rare’ that a habeas corpus petitioner advances a substantial claim of innocence and rarer still that these actual innocence claims actually succeed….If a Board hearing is nevertheless required even in the circumstance where a court concludes a habeas corpus petitioner has succeeded in making the extremely rare and demanding Schlup innocence showing, section 1485.55(a) is practically dead letter; we can fathom few if any circumstances in which a court in habeas corpus proceedings must make a more definitive pronouncement of innocence than the pronouncement letter; we can fathom few if any circumstances in which a court in habeas corpus proceedings must make a more definitive pronouncement of innocence than the pronouncement Schlup requires.”
The opinion in Souliotes was authored by Acting Presiding Justice Thomas L. Willhite Jr.
Willhite’s View
He wrote:
“Although the terms ‘actual innocence’ and ‘factual innocence’ often are used interchangeably, the standard used by the federal court to find ‘actual innocence’ under Schlup is not equivalent to the standard used by the California Legislature in defining ‘factual innocence.’ ”
He explained:
“[W]e conclude that a Schlup gateway ruling is not a ruling the district court makes ‘in considering a petition for habeas corpus.’ While Souliotes is correct that the district court could not have granted the habeas petition without first making the Schlup gateway finding, that finding necessarily could not have been a part of the court’s consideration of the petition. The entire—and only—purpose of the Schlup gateway proceeding is to determine whether the district court will consider a habeas petition that is procedurally barred.... Thus, the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the court in ruling that Souliotes could pass through the Schlup gateway are not findings that establish the basis for the courts ruling or order in considering his habeas petition.”
Baker remarked:
“The rationale animating the result reached in Souliotes is not persuasive.”
The case is Larsen v. California Victim Compensation Board, B297857.
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